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WILLINGNESS TO PAY VS. WILLINGNESS TO
ACCEPT: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS
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ABSTRACT
Do people value commodities more when they own the commodities
than when they do not? Although economic models generally presume
that economic agents evaluate commodities independently of whether the
agents own those commodities--the "basic independence" assumption-
researchers in economics and law are starting to doubt whether this as-
sumption is true. Doubts about the soundness of the basic independence
assumption challenge accepted economic doctrines. Most theoretical
and applied models in economics use the basic independence assumption
both to predict and to assess the operation of markets. In the relatively
new discipline that combines law and economics, the basic independence
assumption produces the Coase Theorem, which is the starting point for
much economic analysis of legal rules.
This Article presents, organizes, and critiques the modem evidence on
the basic independence assumption, drawing together the learning of
economists and lawyers. The Article first investigates evidence on the
divergence between willingness to accept ("WTA") and willingness to
pay ("WTP") measures of value and possible explanations for this evi-
dence. Next, the Article explores the implications of the divergence for
analysis in law and economics. Finally, the Article shows that although
the divergence between willingness to accept and willingness to pay
measures of value may entail a substantial limitation on the role of
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cost/benefit analysis, the scope of those limits cannot be precisely deter-
mined without answering some difficult questions regarding the source of
the disparity between WTA and WTP.
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PROLOGUE
In 1975, I (Matthew Spitzer) attended Professor Robert Ellickson's
class on land development at the University of Southern California Law
Center. Early in the semester, Professor Ellickson turned to the class
and asked the students the following question: "For how little would
you be willing to sell your casebook from first-year Torts class? Not just
any copy, but the one that you underlined and the one that contains your
notes in the margin." After eliciting responses from us, Professor Ellick-
son then asked: "Now, assume that you lost your Torts casebook, that
someone turned it into the lost-and-found, and that the applicable rules
governing finders would give undisputed title of the book to the lost-and-
found. How much would you be willing to pay for your old, first-year
Torts casebook?" Professor Ellickson collected the responses and com-
pared them. Noticing that most students would demand much more to
sell their old Torts casebooks than they would be willing to pay to buy
the same books back, he frowned and shook his head from side to side.
"This cannot be right," he said. "The responses are supposed to be the
same. Some of you must not be telling the truth." But the students pro-
tested that they had responded to his query honestly. Professor Ellick-
son considered the possibility for a moment and then asked, "But if you
would pay no more than one or two dollars to buy back your Torts
casebook, why would you not sell it for less than five or ten dollars?"
The class was stymied, managing only to convey the sense that the two
situations seemed quite different. I, on the other hand, had completed
first year introductory graduate courses in economics and had a pat an-
swer. "Wealth effects," I shouted from the back of the classroom. Again
Professor Ellickson frowned and shook his head. "Wealth effects are
probably too small to produce this sort of result. There must be some-
thing else involved." I thought for a moment, decided that if my class-
mates had well-behaved, twice differentiable utility functions, Professor
Ellickson was probably right. I resolved to follow Samuel Clemens' ad-
vice about keeping your mouth shut and letting people think you a fool-
at least for the remainder of that class hour. Professor Ellickson
shrugged and went on with his lesson plan.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Do people value commodities more when they own the commodities
than when they do not? Economic models generally presume that people
evaluate commodities independently of whether they own those com-
modities-the "basic independence" assumption. Yet, scholars in eco-
nomics and law are beginning to doubt whether this assumption is
correct. Questions about the validity of the basic independence assump-
tion challenge accepted economic doctrines. Most economic models util-
ize the basic independence assumption to predict and to evaluate the
operation of markets. In the relatively new research area that combines
law and economics,1 the basic independence assumption produces the
Coase Theorem,2 which is the genesis for much economic analysis of
legal rules. If the basic independence assumption fails, most economic
models may also fail. To better understand the importance of the basic
independence assumption, consider the following example. A home-
owner lives next to a smelter. The smelter's operations emit foul-smell-
ing smoke that interferes with the homeowner's view of the mountains.
Under these circumstances, the law might give the homeowner a legal
right to clean air, and thus require the smelter to buy the homeowner's
permission to emit smoke. Alternatively, the law might give the smelter
the right to emit smoke, in effect requiring the homeowner to buy the
right to clean air from the smelter.
If the distribution of ownership does not determine value (and several
other assumptions are true),3 then in order to predict how much smoke
the smelter will emit, one need only ascertain each side's willingness to
pay for air at different quality levels. If the homeowner will pay a large
sum of money for relatively clean air and the smelter is not willing to pay
very much to produce smoke, then the smelter will emit very little
smoke, regardless of which party has the legal right to the air. If the law
assigns the right to emit smoke to the smelter, the homeowner will
purchase a large reduction in smoke from the smelter. If the law assigns
the right to clean air to the homeowner, the smelter will not purchase
rights to emit large quantities of smoke. Theoretically, the smelter will
1. The newly-formed American Law and Economics Association had its first meeting in 1991.
2. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). See also Elizabeth
Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & EcON. 73
(1982) (discussing research on the Coase Theorem).
3. For the full set of needed assumptions, see Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 2.
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emit exactly the same amount of smoke, regardless of which side is ini-
tially assigned the rights to the air.4
This prediction-that whenever ownership does not determine value
the final distribution of rights is independent of the initial assignment-is
known as the Coase Theorem, and serves as the basis for many norma-
tive arguments.5 Some claim that the final distribution of rights in a per-
fect market should serve as a legal benchmark: when one side values the
right more than the other side at every level of quality, the common law
should assign property rights to those who would eventually own the
rights. If values do not change based upon who initially owns the right,
this normative prescription closely tracks the Kaldor-Hicks compensa-
tion criterion.6 Others claim that, regardless of whether the Kaldor-
Hicks compensation criterion embraces the situation, the rights should
be awarded to those who value them the most, thus saving the transac-
tion costs of reallocating the rights.7 Still others suggest that damage-
based rules instead of property rules are appropriate; damages would re-
duce the cost of reallocating.8 Damages rules themselves probably incor-
porate the basic independence assumption because damages rules usually
define damages independently of who owns the rights.9 These argu-
4. If one side values control of the air more than the other side at every relevant air quality
level, then the parties will transfer the entire right to the air to the party who values it more, regard-
less of which party the laws initially assigned the right. Therefore, if the homeowner values the right
more than the smelter, the homeowner will end up with the right, regardless of which party the law
first assigned the right. When the law originally assigns the right to the homeowner, the smelter will
choose not to purchase the homeowner's permission to degrade the air. But when the law initially
assigns the right to the smelter, the homeowner will pay the smelter to stop polluting-in essence
purchasing the right to clean air. On the other hand, if at every level of pollution, the smelter values
the right to emit smoke more than the homeowner values the right to clean air, the smelter will
ultimately have the right to emit as much smoke as it desires.
5. Coase has recognized that this result was not really his "Theorem," but a device for empha-
sizing the importance of transaction costs. R. H. CoAsE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW
(1988). Hence, those who attack Coase and his theorem are aiming at the wrong target. Neverthe-
less, because the term "Coase Theorem" is widely accepted, this Article will utilize it. Professor
Coase's name will probably be linked to this prediction for many years.
6. See, eg., Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 509 (1980).
7. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 45 (3d ed. 1986).
8. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972); MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 15-27 (2d ed. 1989); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 36-37 (1987); see also Richard Craswell, Con-
tract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988)
(recognizing that property rules may distort other decisions).
9. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 344-54 (1988) (using reversible
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ments, which are lengthy and complex, provide the focus of some of the
most spirited debates in law and economics. 0
If the basic independence assumption fails, however, all of the forego-
ing may change. Consider a variation of the previous example. If the
law assigns clean air rights to the homeowner, he will not allow the
smelter to degrade the air unless the smelter pays him enough money to
offset the intrusion. "Willingness to accept" ("WTA") is the minimum
amount that the homeowner would accept in exchange for his right to
clean air. If, on the other hand, the law assigns the rights to clean air to
the smelter, the homeowner will pay no more for clean air than such
rights are worth to him. "Willingness to pay" ("WTP") is the maximum
amount that the homeowner would pay for the right to clean air. As-
sume that the amount that the smelter would be willing to pay for the air
rights is "S". This amount is exactly the same amount the smelter would
accept to sell its air rights. In other words, WTA equals WTP
(WTA=WTP) for the smelter.
Assume that the homeowner's WTA exceeds S, which is greater than
the homeowner's WTP (WTA > S > WTP). If the homeowner initially
owns the air rights, he will refuse to sell them to the smelter. If the
smelter initially owns the air rights, the homeowner will refuse to buy.
At a maximum, if WTA > S >WTP at every air quality level, then the
homeowner will neither sell any rights to the smelter (if the homeowner
owns the rights), nor buy any rights to clean air (if the smelter owns the
rights).
If WTA is greater than WTP (WTA>WTP), as described in the
above example, then many normative arguments may change. For exam-
ple, even if no transaction costs exist, there is no longer a unique, well-
defined outcome of Coasian bargaining for those who argue that it pro-
vides a benchmark for the common law. The Kaldor-Hicks compensa-
tion criterion-and all versions of cost/benefit analysis deriving from it-
indifference curves to describe damages rules). See also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8 (using
damage functions that do not depend on the rights defined in the status quo); STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987) (same); WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOM-
ICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1988) (discussing liability rules to make damages in-
dependent of the allocation of rights).
10. See Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980); A Re-
sponse to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HorsTRA L. REV. 811 (1980). See also Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr.,
Comment, Does Benefit Cost Analysis Stand Alone? Rights and Standing, 10 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 96 (1991) (noting both WTP and WTA measures without noting that the two measures may
diverge).
[Vol. 71:59
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss1/2
1993] WILLINGNESS TO PAY VS. WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT
similarly lose whatever precision they may have had. Normative theories
now may require a reference to the status quo for their definition. Sub-
sidiary arguments regarding saving transactions costs may either gain or
lose force, depending upon how much emphasis is placed on them. 1 In
addition, damages rules may also require reference to the status quo.
A small group of economists and other social scientists have scruti-
nized the basic independence assumption. Applied welfare economists
have attempted to refine the methodology of cost/benefit analysis in or-
der to better choose whether to undertake the provision of large-scale
public goods such as environmental improvements.12 Although these
economists have devoted some attention to normative issues, their main
concern has been the careful elucidation of the complexities and subtle-
ties surrounding the disparity between willingness to accept and willing-
ness to pay. In contrast, legal scholars-primarily Duncan Kennedy and
Mark Kelman-have concentrated on the normative implications of
presuming that willingness to accept is greater than willingness to pay.
In their discussions, however, they have failed to address the subtle and
intricate evidence from economics.1 3 Perhaps they were more concerned
with undermining confidence in cost/benefit analysis-and the liberal vi-
sion of society under law that they claim rests (in part) upon cost/benefit
analysis-than they were with evaluating the evidence that they used for
their critiques.
This Article presents, organizes, and critiques modern evidence on the
question of WTA and WTP. The Article first investigates the evidence
on the divergence between WTA and WTP, and then examines possible
11. Transactions costs arguments might lose force because they are in essence justified by the
Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion, which is no longer well-defined. On the other hand, a prag-
matist might argue that although one does not know who will end up with the right, one should save
transactions costs in situations where one strongly suspects that one party will buy the right. This
will reduce expending resources to achieve the inevitable.
12. See text accompanying notes 17-20.
13. See Duncan Kennedy, Cost/Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 387 (1981); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669 (1979). In fairness, both of these works were published
before much of the work reviewed in this Article. However, Kelman's book, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES, repeated the arguments and was written several years after much of the economic
work. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRIcAL LEGAL STUDIES 145-48 (1987). The most recent
legal article on this topic, Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 225 (1991), cited some of the studies contained herein, but did not critique them. Hovenkamp
was interested in the implications of WTA exceeding WTP, particularly for wealth maximization.
Id.
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explanations for such evidence.14 Next, the Article explores the implica-
tions of such a divergence for analysis in law and economics. Finally, the
Article shows that, although the divergence between WTA and WTP
may entail substantially limiting the role of cost/benefit analysis, those
limits cannot be precisely defined without answering difficult questions
regarding the sources of the disparity between WTA and WTP.
II. EVIDENCE ON WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT AND
WILLINGNESS TO PAY
A. Survey Evidence
There are two sources of evidence pertaining to the divergence be-
tween WTA and WTP: surveys and experiments. Survey evidence was
generated first. Economists frequently were given the task of estimating
the costs and benefits of proposed large-scale projects such as power
plants. To estimate costs, economists had to value the loss of environ-
mental goods such as clean air and water. However, because of the ab-
sence of direct markets for spectacular views, economists were unable to
observe any prices. Therefore, in order to value the environmental
goods, economists developed new sources of data. They began by asking
those people affected by such large-scale projects either how much they
would be willing to pay to avoid potential environmental deterioration or
how much they would have to be compensated to accept the same envi-
ronmental deterioration.
Economists have known for many years that WTP and WTA might
differ if the people selling their rights were wealthier than those buying
them. But Robert Willig" argued in a very influential work that under
most circumstances the divergence between WTA and WTP would be
small, probably less than five percent. Economists have assumed that
Willig's analysis applied in the case of environmental goods. Therefore,
they have proceeded to value environmental commodities by inquiring
about WTP in consumer surveys. 6 A typical environmental survey fo-
14. In this regard, it is responsive to Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty
to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 35-40
(1989).
15. Robert D. Willig, Consumer's Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON. REv. 589 (1976).
16. See William D. Schulze et al., Valuing Environmental Commodities: Some Recent Experi-
ments, 57 LAND EON. 151, 151 (1981); Philip A. Meyer, Publicly Vested Values for Fish and Wild-
life: Criteria in Economic Welfare and Interface with the Law, 55 LAND ECON. 223 (1979); Robin
Gregory, Interpreting Measures of Economic Loss: Evidence from Contingent Valuation and Experi-
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cused on a potential increase or decrease in visible air pollution, and con-
tained photographs of both current air quality and how the air would
look with increased or decreased pollution."7 The survey takers showed
the pictures to subjects and asked them how much they would be willing
to pay either to avoid a pictured increase or to enjoy a pictured decrease
in air pollution. 8 Some surveys then gave each subject the opportunity
to change his answer: the surveyors often asked the subject if he would
be willing to pay slightly more for the decrease in pollution, and contin-
mental Studies, 13 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 325 (1986); W. Kip Viscusi et al., Altruistic and
Private Valuations ofRisk Reduction, 7 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 227 (1988); Mark C. Berger et
al., Valuing Changes in Health Risks- A Comparison of Alternative Measures, 53 S. ECON. J. 967
(1987); Trudy A. Cameron & Michelle D. James, Efficient Estimation Methods for "Closed-Ended"
Contingent Valuation Surveys, 69 REv. ECON. & STAT. 269 (1987); Shelby Gerking & Linda R.
Stanley, An Economic Analysis of Air Pollution and Health- The Case of St Louis, 68 REv. ECON. &
STAT. 115 (1986); Francis Antonovitz & Terry Roe, A Theoretical and Empirical Approach to the
Value of Information in Risky Markets, 68 REv. EcON. & STAT. 105 (1986); M. W. Jones-Lee et al.,
The Value of Safety: Results of a National Sample Survey, 95 EcoN. 3. 49 (1985); Richard G. Walsh
et al., Valuing Option, Existence, and Bequest Demands for Wilderness, 60 LAND ECON. 14 (1984); I.
Majid et al., Benefit Evaluation of Increments to Existing Systems of Public Facilities, 59 LAND
ECON. 377 (1983); see generally R. G. CUMMINGS ET AL., VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS: AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1986); Richard T. Carson & Peter
Navarro, Fundamental Issues in Natural Resource Damage Assessment, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 815
(1988); ROBERT C. MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC
GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1989).
Recent theoretical scholarship on consumers' willingness to pay for non-traded goods fails to
consider disparity between WTA and WTP. See, eg., Jon R. Neill, Another Theorem on Using
Market Demands to Determine Willingness to Pay for Non-Traded Goods, 15 J. ENvTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 224 (1988); Jon R. Neill, Bounds on the Willingness to Pay for Non-Traded Goods: A Possible
Theorem, 30 J. PUB. ECON. 267 (1986). The WTP criterion also continues to be used unflinchingly
in many other areas. Cam Donaldson, Note, Willingness to Pay For Publicly-Provided Goods: A
Possible Measure of Benefit?, 9 J. HEALTH ECON. 103 (1990) (nursing home care); Dale Whittington
et al., Estimating the Willingness to Pay for Water Services in Developing Countries: A Case Study of
the Use of Contingent Valuation Surveys in Southern Haiti, 38 EON. DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGE
293 (1990); Mary Jo Kealy et al., Reliability and Predictive Validity of Contingent Values: Does the
Nature of the Good Matter?, 19 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 244 (1990) (testing accuracy of hypo-
thetical WTP at predicting actual willingness to pay to prevent acid rain in the Adirondacks); John
C. Bergstrom et al., The Impact of Information on Environmental Commodity Valuation Decisions,
72 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 614 (1990); Per-Olov Johansson, Willingness to Pay Measures and Expecta-
tions: An Experiment, 22 APPLIED ECON. 313 (1990) (moose hunting permits). But see Paul S.
Carlin & Robert Sandy, Estimating the Implicit Value of a Young Child's Life, 58 S. ECON. J. 186,
187 (1991) (noting that a parent's willingness to pay for a car seat to reduce the chance of death to a
child does not equal the amount, adjusted for chance, that a parent would require to accept the loss
of a child).
17. See, eg., David S. Brookshire et al., Valuing Public Goods" A Comparison of Survey and
Hedonic Approaches, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 165 (1982).
18. Id. at 166.
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ued to ask the subject if he would pay a bit more until he refused. 9 The
survey takers then used the WTP responses as indicative of values in the
target population and computed either the total damage from increasing
pollution or the total value from reducing pollution by extrapolating
from the WTP survey responses.20
In a few surveys, however, researchers explicitly inquired about both
WTP and WTA. The answers have diverged far more than theory would
suggest.21 Economists have been skeptical in response to the divergence,
suggesting that several types of errors affect the results. Such errors in-
clude: (1) strategic responses, where the respondents lie to the surveyor
in an effort to manipulate the outcome in accord with the respondents'
true preferences; (2) information biases, where the surveyors (perhaps
inadvertently) manipulate the responses by supplying information about
the proposed program; (3) instrument biases, where the surveyors' ques-
tioning techniques mold the results; and (4) errors produced by non-
random sampling techniques.22
In the last few years, some experimental economists and psychologists
have started to design and run experiments to test whether WTA is sub-
stantially larger than WTP. This Article, which examines these experi-
19. See, eg., Robert D. Rowe et al., An Experiment in the Economic Value of Visibility, 7 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1980); Alan Randall et al., Bidding Games for Valuation of Aesthetic
Environmental Improvements, 1 J. ENVTL. EON. & MGMT. 132 (1974).
20. See, e.g., DOUGLAS A. GREENLEY ET AL., ECONOMIC BENEFrrS OF IMPROVED WATER
QUALITY: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF OPTION AND PRESERVATION VALUES (1982).
21. See, eg., Rowe et al., supra note 19, at 16; A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, THE BENEFITS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS (1979).
22. See CUMMINGS ET AL., supra note 16, at 21-33; Robin Gregory & Donald MacGregor,
Valuing Changes in Environmental Assets, in ECONOMIC VALUATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES:
ISSUES, THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (R. L. Johnson & G. V. Johnson eds., 1990).
We made very similar arguments in an exchange with Mark Kelman. See Kelman, supra note 13,
at 682 (stating that informal survey evidence showed that WTP and WTA substantially diverge);
Matthew Spitzer & Elizabeth Hoffman, A Reply to Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and
Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1187 (1980) (agreeing that WTP and WTA
might diverge, but contending that Kelman's informal survey evidence was so flawed that it was
useless). However, as this Article clearly demonstrates, we now believe that reliable evidence sug-
gests that Kelman's central intuition may have been correct. In addition, some articles report field
data that suggests the disparity between WTA and WTP. See Russell S. Winer, A Reference Price
Model of Brand Choice for Frequently Purchased Products, 13 J. CONSUMER RES. 250 (1986); Ber-
nard Van Praag, The Welfare Function of Income in Belgium: An Empirical Investigation, 2 EUR.
ECON. REV. 337 (1971); Raymond S. Hartman et al., Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo, 106
Q.J. ECON. 141 (1991); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 26-33 (1988). For a recent extension and partial confirma-
tion, see Huib van de Stadt et al., The Relativity of Utility: Evidence From Panel Data, 67 REv.
ECON. & STAT. 179 (1985).
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ments in some detail, finds that the experiments provide evidence that
WTA may substantially exceed WTP. This result seems most likely to
occur when consumers value consumption goods that are not repeatedly
bought and sold.
B. Experimental Evidence
This section concentrates primarily on four questions. (1) Does WTA
exceed WTP in real experimental markets? (2) Assuming that it does, is
this true only for consumer goods, or is this also true for rights to income
flows, such as securities? (3) Does repeated participation in markets for
rights as a buyer and seller reduce an individual's WTA/WTP spread?
(4) By what factor does WTA exceed WTP?
1. Does WTA Exceed WTP in Experimental Markets?
a. Coursey, Hovis and Schulze
Don Coursey, John Hovis and William Schulze conducted experi-
ments that compared WTP to WTA in both surveys and experimental
markets.2 3 First, they devised a bidding mechanism to encourage sub-
jects to reveal their true WTP and WTA values for agreeing to hold a
one-ounce cup of sucrose octa-acetate ("SOA")-a safe but very bitter-
tasting liquid-in their mouths for twenty seconds. The experimenters
allowed each subject in these experiments to sample the SOA."4
The experimenters asked each of eight subjects to state a willingness to
pay to avoid tasting the SOA. The four highest bidders avoided tasting
the SOA; the remaining four subjects had to taste it. The four highest
bidders, however, had to pay the experimenters only the amount of the
fifth highest bid.25 Under these circumstances, it was in each subject's
self-interest to bid his true willingness to pay to avoid tasting the SOA.
Because the size of the subject's bid determined only whether it was ac-
23. Don L. Coursey et al., The Disparity Between Willingness to Accept and Willingness to Pay
Measures of Value, 102 Q.J. ECoN. 679 (1987). See also Robin Gregory & Lita Furby, Auctions,
Experiments, and Contingent Valuation, 55 PUB. CHOICE 273 (1987); Don L. Coursey, Markets and
the Measurement of Value, 55 PUB. CHOICE 291 (1987).
The discussion of experiments in the text of this Article is limited to those designs where the
subjects' responses triggered outcomes that are important to the subjects. Thus, such experiments
might pay subjects varying amounts of money based upon their responses and the interaction of
random factors. In contrast, some "experiments" ask subjects entirely hypothetical questions. See,
e.g., Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 22, at 12-26.
24. Coursey et al., supra note 23, at 682.
25. Id. at 684.
Washington University Open Scholarship
70 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
cepted, not how much he would have had to pay if it was accepted, the
subject gained nothing by bidding too high or too low.
To illustrate this, consider the costs and benefits of bid deception. The
subject can either bid more than his true WTP value or less than his true
WTP value. If the subject bids more than his true value and wins the
auction, he neither gains nor loses if his true value is actually greater
than or equal to the fifth highest bid. However, if his true value is less
than the fifth highest bid, he eventually pays more than he is truly willing
to pay to avoid tasting the SOA. He would have been better off by bid-
ding his true WTP and placing lower than the top four bids, thereby
keeping his money and tasting the SOA. Now consider what happens to
the subject if he bids less than his true value and loses the auction. If his
true value is actually less than or equal to the fifth highest bid, he neither
gains nor loses by such bid deception. However, if his true WTP value is
greater than the fifth highest bid, then he is forced to taste the SOA, even
though he would have been willing to pay the fifth highest bid price to
avoid tasting it. In sum, a subject never gains, but he can lose, by bid-
ding other than his true WTP value. Coursey, Hovis and Schulze con-
ducted these experiments several times with the same subjects to help the
subjects learn these properties of the bidding mechanism.26
In addition, Coursey, Hovis and Schulze performed experiments to re-
veal the subjects' willingness to accept. These experiments were identical
to the WTP experiments, except that the experimenters asked subjects to
reveal their willingness to accept payment for agreeing to taste the SOA,
and accepted only the four lowest bids. The four lowest bidders were
paid the amount of the fifth lowest bid in return for tasting the SOA.2 7
The experimenters also collected survey data from their subjects re-
garding each person's hypothetical WTA and WTP values. Coursey,
Hovis and Schulze first described the SOA to the subjects before asking
for WTA or WTP. Then, after the experimenters allowed each subject to
sample the SOA, they repeated the WTA or the WTP question." In
both types of surveys, WTA averaged between $7.00 and $15.00, but
WTP only averaged between $3.00 and $4.50.29 In contrast, in the incen-
tive-compatible bidding experiments described above, WTA was much
26. Mechanisms that give subjects incentives to reveal their true values are termed "incentive-
compatible."
27. Coursey et al., supra note 23, at 683.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 685-86.
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greater than WTP in the first few rounds of the experiments; but as the
subjects participated in additional rounds of the experiment, their WTA
values dropped. By the last (tenth) round, WTA had fallen to an average
of about $4.00.30 This was still slightly above the average WTP, but was
close enough to be statistically indistinguishable. The average WTP was
the same in the hypothetical and incentive-compatible rounds.
Coursey, Hovis and Schulze interpreted their result to mean that
"true" WTP does not differ from "true" WTA. 1 They also claimed that
their results indicated that surveys regarding WTP data were most likely
reliable indicators of individuals' true values for goods, but that WTA
survey data was most likely substantially inflated.32 However, several
alternative interpretations of their data remain. To illustrate these alter-
natives, their claims must be decomposed into four steps. They claim
that: (1) WTP and WTA converge to the same value in the incentive-
compatible auctions; (2) the final bids in the incentive-compatible auc-
tions represent true values; and (3) the hypothetical WTP equals actual
WTP in their experimental data. These three claims then show that: (4)
respondents to hypothetical surveys of WTP also reveal their true WTP,
which is identical to their true WTA. This Article shows that the first
claim is probably incorrect. 3  Next, this Article demonstrates that the
experimental results on the behavioral properties of second-price and
fifth-price, sealed-bid auctions suggest that the second claim may also be
unfounded. The third claim, which emerges from their data, is accurate.
The fourth claim, however, is unsupported, since it stands upon the cor-
rectness of the first three claims. Thus, one cannot assume on the basis
of Coursey, Hovis and Schulze's results that responses to hypothetical
WTP surveys represent true WTP and WTA.
Claim (1). Because WTA remains slightly above WTP, true WTA
may exceed WTP by a small amount. Robin Gregory and Lita Furby re-
analyzed the data by excluding wildly aberrant responses before applying
any statistical tests.34 They concluded that WTA exceeded WTP by a
statistically significant amount (approximately $1.00), even on the final
round of the auction.35
30. Id.
31. Id. at 688.
32. Id.
33. Gregory & Furby, supra note 23 at 281.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Claim (2). Perhaps the iterative experiments failed to prompt subjects
to reveal their true valuations. Gregory and Furby suggested that it is
very difficult for most people to understand that the auction's bidding
mechanism should lead them to reveal their true values.36 If subjects do
not understand that it is in their best interests to reveal true values, the
bids might represent strategic bids in a (futile) effort to manipulate the
auction. In this case, the convergence of WTA to WTP is best regarded
as a convergence of strategies, rather than a convergence of true values.
This last criticism is supported by a careful re-analysis of the evidence
linking bids in an incentive-compatible auction and true values. Coursey,
Hovis and Schulze cite James Cox, Bruce Roberson and Vernon Smith, 7
as well as Don Coursey and Vernon Smith,38 in support of their conten-
tion that responses in the incentive-compatible auctions represent true
values.39
Cox, Roberson and Smith studied the behavioral properties of second-
price, sealed-bid auctions, in which each bidder submitted a sealed bid to
purchase a coupon that is redeemable at a given price. In this auction
the highest bidder won the auction, but paid only the second-highest bid
price. In each auction the experimenters gave each subject a redemption
value that specified the amount earned if he or she won that auction.40
Cox, Roberson and Smith conducted a series of such auctions with the
same subjects, with each subject receiving a randomly reassigned re-
demption value in each auction.41 This feature gave each subject an op-
portunity to win at least once during the series of auctions. Like the
fifth-price auction discussed above, the second-price, sealed-bid auction
should lead subjects to bid their true values because the winner of the
auction pays only the second-highest bid price. However, Cox, Roberson
and Smith found that, at first, bidders in these experimental auctions did
not behave as predicted.42 In particular, subjects tended to bid less than
36. Id at 279. See also Jack L. Knetsch & J. A. Sinden, The Persistence of Evaluation Dispari-
ties, 102 Q.J. ECON. 691, 692 (1987). Knetsch and Sinden criticized Coursey et al. for providing a
$10.00 cash payment for participation in the experiment to WTP subjects, but not to WTA subjects.
Id at 693.
37. James Cox et al., Theory and Behavior of Single Object Auctions, 2 REs. IN EXPERIMENTAL
EcoN. I (Vernon L. Smith ed., 1982).
38. Don L. Coursey & Vernon L. Smith, Experimental Tests of an Allocation Mechanism for
Private, Public, and Externality Goods, 86 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 468 (1984).
39. Coursey et al., supra note 23.
40. Cox et al., supra note 37, at 3.
41. Id. at 15-18.
42. Id. at 26.
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their true values. But, over time, most participants learned that it was in
their best interests to bid their true values. Thus, Cox, Roberson and
Smith's results provide evidence that participants in an incentive-com-
patible auction eventually learn to bid their true values.
Unfortunately, the results from the Cox, Roberson and Smith experi-
ment have not been consistently replicated. Cox and Smith themselves,
as well as others, have subsequently found that many high-valuation sub-
jects actually bid more than their true values in these auctions; moreover,
many low-valuation subjects bid less.43
In addition, Coursey and Smith" and James Cox, Vernon Smith and
James Walker45 tested the behavioral properties of a fifth-price auction
similar to the fifth-price auction used in the Coursey, Hovis and Schulze
study.46 Coursey and Smith and Cox, Smith and Walker assigned re-
demption values to subjects, as in the Cox, Roberson and Smith study,47
and then conducted a series of sealed-bid auctions for four units that
were to be sold to the four highest bidders at the fifth-highest bid price.4"
They found that some high-valuation participants bid more than their
true values, while low-valuation participants generally bid less than their
true values.49 The average bid price was significantly below the average
redemption value for the four highest valuation participants.5"
Thus, subjects tend to both overbid and underbid in both second-price
and fifth-price, sealed-bid auctions, even though both auctions should
theoretically induce subjects to bid their true values. These findings sug-
gest that the revelations of value in the fifth-price auction for the SOA
cannot be accepted as representing true value.
Many of the experimental works that we review below use some ver-
sion of the fifth (or second, or "nth") price auction to derive values from
subjects. To the extent that the value responses are not trustworthy,
43. See James C. Cox, Vernon L. Smith & James M. Walker, Expected Revenue in Discrimina-
tive and Uniform Price Sealed-Bid Auctions, in 3 REs. IN EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 183 (Vernon L.
Smith ed., 1985); John H. Kagel et al., Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with
Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study, 55 ECONOMETRICA 1275 (1987)
44. Coursey & Smith, supra note 38.
45. Cox, Smith & Walker, supra note 43, at 183-84.
46. Coursey et al., supra note 23.
47. Cox et al., supra note 37.
48. Coursey & Smith, supra note 38, at 469.
49. Id. at 479-82.
50. "Column (4) in Table 1, reporting observed market clearing prices for the private good
shows a strong tendency to be much below the demand revealing competitive equilibrium prices
.... Coursey & Smith, supra note 38, at 479.
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many of the experiments' results are suspect. When we discuss the ex-
perimental results we will not repeat this criticism at each point. How-
ever, one should remember that this critique could apply to any of the
experiments utilizing these demand-revealing mechanisms."
In summary, Coursey, Hovis and Schulze contend that responses to
hypothetical WTP surveys represent true WTP, which equals true
WTA 2 Their conclusion, however, is unsupported and unfounded,
since its validity rests on the accuracy of their other claims. Thus, based
on the Coursey, Hovis and Schulze study, it is impossible to conclude
that responses to hypothetical WTP surveys represent either true WTP
or true WTA.
b. Boyce et al.
Rebecca Boyce, Thomas Brown, Gary McCelland, George Peterson
and William Schulze ("Boyce et al.") investigated whether WTA might
exceed WTP for an irreversible choice concerning the preservation of
animal or plant species, or of environmental amenities.13 The environ-
mental economics literature refers to such preservation value as "exist-
ence value" or "option value."54
To identify existence value and test for any difference between WTA
and WTP, Boyce et al. used a houseplant that resembled a pine tree in
both appearance and growth rate. Due to previous criticism of the be-
havioral properties of fifth-price auctions, the authors decided to use a
different incentive-compatible mechanism-termed "BDM"-for elicit-
ing WTP and WTA values. 5
51. See also David W. Harless, More Laboratory Evidence on the Disparity Between Willingness
to Pay and Compensation Demanded, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 359-68 (1989) (issuing the same
caution).
52. Gregory & Furby, supra note 23, at 688.
53. Rebecca R. Boyce et al., An Experimental Examination of Intrinsic Values as a Source of
the WTA-WTP Disparity, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 1366 (1992).
54. Preserving a species or an unspoiled wilderness area might have value because of the irre-
versibility of species extinction or environmental deterioration. Preservation maintains the option
for future use.
55. The BDM mechanism works as follows in this experiment. In the WTP experiments each
participant was asked to name a willingness to pay for a specific Norfolk Island pine placed on his
computer terminal. Gordon M. Becker et al., Measuring Utility by a Single-Response Sequential
Method, 9 BEHAV. Sci. 226 (1964). After each participant indicated his WTP, a random bingo ball
was drawn for each participant with replacement of prior drawn balls. Thus, each subject's refer-
ence value was independent of the other subjects' reference values, thereby eliminating one potential
reason for misrepresentation in the fifth-price auctions. Each bingo ball represented a different dol-
lar amount. The participants knew the schedule. If a participant's WTP was greater than or equal
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Boyce et al. obtained WTP and WTA values in two types of experi-
ments: kill and no kill. In the kill experiments, they told subjects that
any trees not sold or kept would be killed at the end of the experiment.
To maintain credibility without inflicting undue psychic pain, one ran-
domly-chosen subject witnessed the tree killing and then reported to the
other subjects that the trees had been destroyed. In the no kill version of
the WTP and WTA experiments, Boyce et al. gave the subjects no infor-
mation about the trees' prospects for survival, and no remaining trees
were destroyed. 6 Each subject in the laboratory experiment participated
in one of the following experimental treatments, using the BDM method
for valuation:57 (1) WTP/kill; (2) WTP/no kill; (3) WTA/kill; or (4)
WTA/no kill.
Boyce et al."5 found that WTA was slightly higher than WTP in the no
kill experimental auctions. The mean WTA was $8.00 and mean WTP
was $4.81.11 In the kill experiments, on the other hand, the difference
was substantially larger. Moreover, WTP/kill was greater than
WTP/no kill and WTA/kill was greater than WTA/no kill. The mean
WTA/kill was $18.43 and mean WTP/kill was $7.81. ° Boyce et al.
to the dollar amount on his bingo ball, he paid his WTP and was allowed to take the houseplant
home. If his WTP was less than the dollar amount on his bingo ball, he did not purchase the
houseplant. Id. at 228. Participants in the WTP experiments were given an initial balance of $40.
After 10 trial auctions, the plants were actually sold in the eleventh auction.
The WTA experiments were symmetric, with 10 practice rounds followed by an actual sales auc-
tion. Each participant was given $30 and a Norfolk Island pine and was asked to state a willingness
to accept to sell the plant back to the experimenter. If the participant's WTA was less than or equal
to the dollar amount on his randomly chosen bingo-ball he received his WTA, but did not keep the
plant. If his WTA was greater than the dollar amount on his bingo ball he kept the plant, but
received no additional money. Participants in the WTA experiments were initially given $30 ($10
less than in the WTP experiment). The difference was hypothesized to control for wealth effects: in
the WTP experiments the participants started with cash only; in the WTA experiments they began
with cash plus a plant. Boyce et al., supra note 53, at 1369.
56. Each participant completed a hypothetical questionnaire before the experiment began.
Each participant was then shown a picture of a Norfolk Island pine and read a description of the
plant. He was then asked to state either the most that he would pay to purchase one or the least that
he would accept to sell one he owns. Participants in the kill experiments were told that the plants
would be destroyed if they did not buy or keep them. Participants in the no kill experiments were
given no information about the disposition of the plants that were not bought. Finally, to control for
the emotional effect of the laboratory environment, the kill surveys were also administered to a
sample of the University of Colorado staff and students in the workplace. The sample was designed
to match the participants in the laboratory experiments.
57. Boyce et al., supra note 53, at 1369.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1370.
60. All differences are significant at the five percent level; the hypothesis of equal means can be
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interpreted their results as indicating that WTA exceeds WTP, especially
when the preservation of the plant is at stake (existence value, in their
interpretation). 61 Moreover, both WTP and WTA are higher in the pres-
ence of existence value.
While we cannot yet evaluate the Boyce et al. results to the extent that
we have analyzed the Coursey, Hovis and Schulze results, 62 the two stud-
ies suggest an acute difference between WTP and WTA. Although
Schulze and other coauthors have presented some preliminary findings
suggesting that the BDM mechanism performs significantly better than
the fifth-price auction, 63 the BDM mechanism has not yet received in-
dependent testing. This approach to elicitation of value requires further
study. If the BDM mechanism survives further scrutiny, we would con-
clude on the basis of Boyce et al.'s results that WTA exceeds WTP in the
context of this experiment.
c. Other Experimental Work
Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler also tested
whether WTA is greater than WTP in both experimental markets and in
survey data.64 Their experimental markets started by distributing a small
consumer item-in some experiments, Cornell coffee mugs, and, in other
experiments, boxed ball point pens with price tags indicating that the
pens were for sale for $3.98-to one half of an assembled group.65 After
each subject examined the consumer goods, the experimenters asked a
series of questions. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler asked those who
had received the mugs or pens if they would agree to relinquish the items
at various prices. They also asked those who did not receive a consumer
good if they would agree to buy the good at various prices. They told the
rejected at the five percent level of significance with a nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. Id.
at 1371.
61. Id.
62. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
63. Gary McClelland, Michael McKee, & William Schulze, The BDM Lives: Task Trans-
parency and Payoff Dominance (Oct. 26, 1990) (paper presented to the Economic Science Associa-
tion Annual Meetings, on file with the authors).
64. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theo-
rem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990). Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidehce of Non-
Reversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 1277 (1989); see also David S. Brookshire &
Don L. Coursey, Measuring the Value of a Public Good: An Empirical Comparison of Elicitation
Procedures, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 554 (1987).
65. Kahneman et al., supra note 64, at 1330-31.
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subjects that the actual price would be selected later.66 The subjects par-
ticipated in four identical markets in a row and were told before the ex-
periment that one of the markets would be selected at random. Their
responses in the selected market would determine whether or not they
would buy (or sell) the consumer good at the price selected in the
market.
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler argued that under these circum-
stances, subjects have very little incentive to misrepresent their prefer-
ences.67 This argument is persuasive because, like the Coursey, Hovis
and Schulze experiments, statements of WTP or WTA determined
whether a bid or offer would be accepted but not the price at which it
would be bought or sold. The market determined the price. Since many
subjects participated in the Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler experiment,
no individual subject could reasonably believe that changing his own bid
would likely affect the overall market price.68
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler then argued that if subjects reveal
their true WTA and WTP, and if WTA equals WTP, it is reasonable to
expect, on average, that about one half of the consumer goods will trade
hands in each experiment.69 On the other hand, if WTA exceeds WTP,
significantly fewer than half of the goods will trade. They found that
only approximately one sixth of the consumer goods traded, rather than
the one half predicted by the WTA equals WTP hypothesis. In addition,
the buyers' median WTP tended to be less than one half of the sellers'
median WTA.7°
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler conducted another set of mug experi-
ments in which they divided subjects into three groups: buyers, sellers,
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Of course, the criticisms of the responses found in Coursey, Hovis and Schulze's experi-
ments apply here as well. See supra text accompanying notes 23-51.
69. Kahneman et al., supra note 64, at 1332.
70. Another possible interpretation of their data further illustrates the relationship between
wealth effects and the possibility of a divergence between WTP and WTA measures of value. Sup-
pose, for example, that in the absence of any wealth effects WTP equals WTA. Now suppose that
half of the group is given consumer goods such as coffee mugs or pens. That group is now wealthier
than the other group. If demand for the good increases in wealth, then the demand curve for the
wealthier group should be higher than the demand curve for the poorer group. Similarly, viewing
each subject's supply curve as the number that he is willing to part with at different prices, then the
wealthier group will require a higher supply price to part with each successive unit. The combina-
tion of a low demand price from the poorer buyers and a high supply price from the wealthier sellers
results in fewer trades than one would expect if there truly were no wealth effects. While it is
arguably reasonable that wealth effects are not likely to be large, the extent of wealth effects is
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and choosers.71 Just as in the first experiment, Knetsch et al. asked the
buyers to establish buying prices (maximum WTP) and the sellers to
state selling prices (minimum WTA). Then they told choosers to decide
between the mug and a stated cash price at each possible price. 72 Both
the buyers and the sellers named indistinguishable relative prices from
those in the previous experiment: mean selling prices were significantly
higher than mean buying prices." However, the mean price for choosers
was the same as the mean price for buyers,74 suggesting a real divergence
between WTA and WTP, independent of any wealth effects.
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler also performed a set of Coasian bar-
gaining experiments designed to test whether WTA exceeds WTP in a
two-person bargaining setting. They paired off fifty-two subjects. The
experimenters gave one person in each pair a coffee mug and told him
that he could either keep it and take it home, or sell it to his paired-off
partner.75 Using their analysis, if WTA equals WTP, one would expect
on average about thirteen trades (one half of the twenty-six pairs). But
only six trades occurred,76 suggesting that WTA exceeds WTP in this
Coasian model.
2. Does WTA Exceed WTP for Rights to Future Cash Flows, Such
as Securities?
Very little evidence on the relative valuation of securities exists, but
what is known suggests that WTA equals WTP for the simplest form of
security-the right to receive a certain cash payment. But for more com-
plex securities, such as the right to receive the possible proceeds of a
undeterminable without assuming a cardinal utility measure. One simply cannot predict the magni-
tude of a "small" or "large" income effect in a world of ordinal utility.
Applying this reasoning to the observed divergence between WTP and WTA in environmental
surveys is straightforward. Consider the issue of air quality in the Grand Canyon. If the air in the
Grand Canyon is clean one is, in effect, wealthier than if the air is dirty. Thus, based on the above
argument, one would demand more to "sell" some of that clean air than if one did not own it
initially. And, symmetrically, if one did not already have clean air, then one would demand a price
less than if one owned it originally. The authors wish to thank Vernon Smith for suggesting this idea
for rationalizing the experimental results. See Robert Franciosi et al., The Endowment Effect: How
Discontinuous is Hicksian Excess Demand at the Origin? (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the authors). For a replication of Kabneman et al., see supra note 64.
71. Kahneman et al., supra note 64, at 1339.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1340-41.
76. Id.
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fairly simple gamble or the purchase of insurance, WTA may exceed
WTP.
a. Simple Securities
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler conducted experiments in which sub-
jects traded a security representing the right to an immediate and fixed
cash payment.77 These experiments took place in both an organized
market and in a two-person Coasian bargaining setting. In both experi-
mental forms, the evidence strongly suggested that WTA equals WTP.
In the market experiments, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler distrib-
uted index cards to subjects, and instructed as follows:
In this market the objects being traded are tokens [3x5 cards]. You are an
owner, so you now own a token [You are a buyer, so you have an opportu-
nity to buy a token] which has a value to you of $x. It has this value to you
because the experimenter will give you this much money for it. The value
of the token is different for different individuals. A price for the tokens will
be determined later. For each of the prices listed below, please indicate
whether you prefer to:
(1) Sell your token at this price and receive the market price. [Buy a token
at this price and cash it in for the sum of money indicated above.][ or]
(2) Keep your token and cash it in for the sum of money indicated above.
[Not buy a token at this price.]
For each price indicate your decision by marking an X in the appropriate
column.
At a price of $Y I will sell [buy] -. I will not sell [buy] _. 78
The stated redemption values on the 3x5 index cards produced one set
of supply and demand curves, while the subjects' responses produced a
second set of curves. The experimenters honestly informed the subjects
that the price in the experimental market would be set at the intersection
of the supply and demand curves produced by their responses, and that
all offers to sell (buy) the token 3x5 index cards below (above) that price
would be executed.79 Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler computed the ex-
pected price and quantity traded in the experimental market, assuming
that WTA equals WTP, from the supply and demand curves produced
by the stated redemption values. The experimenters then compared the
expected price and quantity to the actual price and quantity, and found
77. Id. at 1329-30.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1330.
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that they were so close that they could not reject the hypothesis that
WTA equals WTP.8
Kalmeman, Knetsch and Thaler's Coasian bargaining experiments
proceeded somewhat differently. They designated subjects as either
buyers or sellers and gave them personalized redemption values for the
coupons the experimenters distributed."1 They divided the subjects into
thirty-nine pairs-one buyer and one seller per pair-and distributed a
coupon to each seller. All sellers had redemption values of $3.00, while
buyers had redemption values of $5.00. 2 Applying their previous argu-
ment, if WTA equals WTP, it is reasonable to expect the sale of all
thirty-nine coupons. However, if WTA exceeds WTP by a significant
amount, a lower sales volume would occur, because some sellers would
value their coupons more than the buyers would be willing to pay.
Twenty-nine out of thirty-five coupons were sold-a result clearly consis-
tent with WTA equals WTP.83
b. Securities Involving Risk
Peter Knez, Vernon Smith and Arlington Williams conducted experi-
ments that suggested that hypothetical WTA may exceed hypothetical
WTP for relatively simple securities.84 They performed three sets of ex-
periments, each consisting of several independent trading periods for a
security that had a fifty percent chance to pay $.50 and a fifty percent
chance to pay $2.00.15 Hence, the expected value of this security was
$1.25 (50% X $.50 + 50% X $2.00). They gave each of the nine sub-
jects in each experiment securities and cash. Before trading began in
each period, the experimenters asked each subject to state his WTP and
WTA for such a security. Trading then proceeded, securities changed
hands, and the holders of the securities were paid their dividends.
They found that at the beginning of each experiment individual sub-
jects typically stated a higher WTA price than WTP price. 6 However,
the actual trading price was always less than or equal to the WTA price
80. Id. at 1332.
81. Id. at 1340.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Peter Knez et al., Individual Rationality, Market Rationality, and Value Estimation, 75
AM. EcON. REv. 397 (May 1985).
85. Id. at 400.
86. Id. at 401.
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and greater than or equal to the WTP price.8 7 This suggests that subjects
may state different buying and selling prices but that they are willing to
actually trade at a compromise price. Moreover, there was a tendency
for WTA and WTP to converge as each experiment progressed. This
suggests that repeated experience with the markets caused the subjects to
reevaluate their responses, eventually bringing both WTP and WTA
closer to actual trading prices.
Harinder Singh reported results of experiments very similar to those of
Knez, Smith and Williams. 8 Using simple securities, Singh elicited
WTA and WTP values in a survey and then conducted a market in the
simple securities. Singh's subjects reported that their WTA exceeded
their WTP in only one of Singh's two surveys. Yet, in both experimental
markets WTA equalled WTP. 9
David Harless also reported the results of experiments (but not
surveys) which tested WTA and WTP for simple securities. 9° Harless
found that although WTA was slightly greater than WTP, the difference
was not significant. 91 No trend developed from the experience of re-
peated participation in experimental markets. This result is not surpris-
ing, given Harless' determination that WTA is equal to WTP from the
beginning.
Gary McClelland and William Schulze conducted a series of experi-
ments in which subjects could "either submit bids to buy (WTP) or offers
to sell (WTA) either a lottery ticket (forty percent chance of winning
$10.00-a gain) or an insurance policy (against a forty percent chance of
losing $10.00-a loss)." '92 In the WTP loss experiments, the experiment-
ers initially gave each subject $25.00; then the subjects participated in a
fifth-price auction for the insurance policy. The four highest bidders
purchased the policy for the fifth-highest bid price. After the auction, a
chip was drawn from an urn containing forty percent red chips and sixty
percent white chips. If a red chip was drawn the potential loss was
deemed to have occurred and those who did not purchase the insurance
87. Id.
88. Hadnder Singh, The Disparity Between Willingness To Pay And Compensation Demanded:
Another Look at Laboratory Evidence, 35 ECON. LETTERS 263 (1991).
89. Id. at 265.
90. Harless, supra note 51.
91. Id. at 376.
92. Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze, The Disparity Between Willingness to Pay Ver-
sus Willingness to Accept as a Framing Effect, in FRONTIERS OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CLYDE COOMBS (Donald R. Brown & J.E. Keith Smith eds., 1991).
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policy sustained the loss.93
In the WTA loss experiment, the experimenters gave each subject
$25.00 and the insurance policy described above. They next asked each
person to submit a bid for what he would be willing to accept to sell the
policy. A fifth-price auction in which the four lowest offers sold the pol-
icy for the fifth-lowest price determined the market price for selling the
policy. Those who sold their policies then sustained the loss if a red chip
was drawn.94
The gain experiments were symmetric. In the WTP gain experiments,
subjects started with $25.00 and submitted bids for lottery tickets for a
forty percent chance to win a $10.00 prize. The lottery tickets were then
sold in a fifth-price auction. Those who purchased the tickets won
$10.00 if a red chip was drawn from the urn. In the WTA gain experi-
ments, the experimenters gave each subject $25.00 and a lottery ticket
and four tickets were then sold back in a fifth-price auction.95
McClelland and Schulze found that in three of the four experimental
treatments (WTA gain, WTP gain, and WTP loss) both the mean and
mode of individual bids or offers were only marginally above the ex-
pected value of $4.00 (40% x $10.00).96 Moreover, between sixty percent
and eighty percent of all bids were about $5.00. In the WTA loss treat-
ment, however, there was a bi-modal distribution with a fat tail on the
high end. The two modes were at about $5.00 and $10.00, with substan-
tial secondary modes at approximately $12.50, $15.00, $20.00, and even
$30.00. 9 7 In other words, many subjects in the WTA loss experiments
were essentially signalling either that they would only sell for the full
value of the loss, if it occurred, or that they would not sell at any price.
In the other three experimental treatments, subjects quickly learned the
expected value of the insurance policy or lottery ticket.
Jack Knetsch and J.A. Sinden conducted several experiments that re-
main difficult to classify within this Article's framework. 93 They used
93. Id. at 173.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 174.
96. Id. at 177.
97. Id. at 179.
98. Jack L. Knetsch & J. A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay the Compensation Demanded: Experi-
mental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1984) (report-
ing experiments involving trades of chocolate bars and cash in which WTA exceeded WTP); Jack L.
Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON.
Rv. 1277 (1989).
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lotteries involving the choice between vouchers for consumer goods or
cash. In one experiment they gave lottery tickets to seventy-six subjects
and offered one half of the subjects the opportunity to sell the tickets
back to the experimenter for $2.00, while the others were required to pay
$2.00 to keep their tickets.99 They informed the subjects that the winner
of the lottery would receive "either $70 worth of merchandise vouchers
redeemable at a local variety store or, at the choice of the winner, $50 in
cash.""' 0 Knetsch and Sinden claimed that, if WTA is equal to WTP
and if wealth effects are negligible, the number of people who refuse to
pay $2.00 to keep the ticket and the number of people who sell the lottery
ticket for $2.00 will be equal. If WTA exceeds WTP, however, a fewer
number of people should opt to sell the lottery ticket. 01 Knetsch and
Sinden observed that nineteen of thirty-eight subjects refused to pay
$2.00 for their lottery ticket, but only nine of thirty-eight agreed to sell
the ticket back.10 2 Knetsch and Sinden performed four other sets of sim-
ilarly designed experiments. In all but one of these experiments, Knetsch
and Sinden found results which suggested that WTA exceeds WTP. 10°
The exception was consistent with the hypothesis that WTA equals
WTP.
Knetsch and Sinden designed another experiment to measure the dis-
parity between WTA and WTP. Each of 128 subjects was given a lottery
ticket entitling the winner to his choice of $90.00 in bookstore vouchers
or $70.00 in cash. The experiment required one half of the subjects to
pay to keep the tickets, while the other half was offered cash to give the
tickets back. They divided buying subjects into four equally-sized groups
and required the subjects to pay $1.00, $2.00, $3.00, or $4.00 for the
ticket. They also divided the selling subjects into four equally-sized
groups and offered them $1.00, $2.00, $3.00, or $4.00 for the tickets."°4
More subjects refused the compensation offer than agreed to pay for the
tickets,105 thus supporting Knetsch and Sinden's earlier findings. They
also determined an expected value for WTA and WTP from this data by
calculating the probability that a randomly-chosen individual would be
willing to accept varying levels of payment, and by calculating the
99. Knetsch & Sinden, supra note 98, at 509-10.
100. Id. at 510.
101. Id. at 511.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 513.
104. Id. at 514-16.
105. Id. at 511-14.
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probability that a randomly-chosen individual would be willing to pay
various amounts. Next, they multiplied these probabilities by the
amounts involved ($1.00, $2.00, $3.00, or $4.00) to obtain an expected
value. They estimated that WTP=$1.28 and WTA=$5.18.0 6 Thus,
their evidence was consistent with the survey evidence that estimated
that WTA is four to five times greater than WTP.
The summarized evidence above is mixed. Knetsch and Sinden's re-
sults suggest that WTA exceeds WTP for simple, risky securities. Knez,
Smith and Williams' findings show that subjects learn over time to equate
WTA to WTP, even when faced with risk."0 7 However, McClelland and
Schulze's conclusions suggest that WTA exceeds WTP for risky mone-
tary assets under certain special circumstances, even after such
learning.10 8
3. Does Repeated Participation in a Market Reduce the Spread
Between WTA and WTP?
This Article has already reviewed all of the studies dealing with the
issue of whether repeated participation in a market reduces the diver-
gence between WTA and WTP. Knetsch, Thaler and Kahneman found
no trend toward WTA equaling WTP in their four-period experiments,
but the multi-period experiments by both Coursey, Hovis and Schulze
and Knez, Smith and Williams did produce evidence of such a trend.
Moreover, McClelland, Schulze and Coursey found that WTA equals
WTP when bidding for a lottery ticket, but WTA exceeds WTP when
bidding for insurance against a loss. Thus, the results of experimentation
on this issue are inconclusive and may depend on particular circum-
stances and contexts.
4. By What Factor does WTA Exceed WTP?
This Article has reviewed most of the evidence on the issue of deter-
mining the factor by which WTA exceeds WTP. The results of testing
range from Coursey, Hovis and Schulze's conclusion that WTA exceeds
106. Id. at 515-16. Notice that this evidence for WTA exceeding WTP is much stronger than
their evidence that fewer participants accepted $2.00 to sell than were willing to pay $2.00 to buy. If
they are correct that average WTP is $1.28 and average WTA is $5.18, then the observed difference
between willingness to buy and willingness to sell is indicative that WTA exceeds WTP.
107. Knez et al., supra note 84, at 401.
108. McClelland & Schulze, supra note 92.
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WTP by a very small amount to the survey data that finds ratios of four
to one, and sometimes even higher ratios.
III. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EVIDENCE
This section of the Article reviews several explanations for the evi-
dence presented in the section above. One explanation has been men-
tioned and is based on a reinterpretation of the wealth effect. The other
explanations fall into two groups. First, there are psychological theories
that represent alternatives to the mainstream economic assumption that
individuals mentally convert all of their noncash holdings into cash and
then choose, from all possible combinations of goods and services that
they can afford, the one that maximizes their utility. All of these alterna-
tive explanations are more elaborate than the mainstream economic as-
sumption, but their force is undercut by the need to categorize events, on
an ad hoc basis, into separate psychological categories. We examine the
following: prospect theory; value (or preference) uncertainty; existence
values; the need to "close" transactions; and the "endowment effect."
Second, we consider the possibility that subjects either interpret WTA
and WTP questions in fundamentally different ways or misrepresent
their true preferences to experimenters.
A. Wealth Effects
As we previously indicated, traditional wisdom held that wealth effects
were small. The traditional notions, however, were based upon work
that analyzed wealth effects due to price changes. Where ownership
changes, however, wealth effects might be larger. Real, significant differ-
ences between WTA and WTP could result from a wealth effect associ-
ated with ownership. For example, a person who could view the Grand
Canyon without smog might pay substantially more to preserve that un-
obstructed view than he would be willing to pay to obtain the view.
Figure 1 illustrates how such a wealth effect could be quite large. Fig-
ure 1 shows a set of "indifference curves" for clean air and other goods
for a representative consumer. The consumer has G, of other goods to
consume. If the consumer has relatively pristine air, he is at point B:
consuming G1 other goods and enjoying A, amount of clean air. How-
ever, if the consumer has relatively dirty air, he is at point C: on a lower
indifference curve, still consuming G1 other goods, but breathing A2. If
asked to name the minimum that he would accept to move from point A,
19931
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to point A2, the consumer endowed with pristine air would say G2 minus
G1. With (32 in other goods, the "wealthier" consumer is able to remain
on the same indifference curve (U1) breathing dirtier air. If the same
consumer had dirty air, however, he would say that GI minus G3 was the
maximum that he would pay to improve air quality from point A2 to
point A1. With G3 other goods and clean air (A,), this "poorer" con-
sumer is on the same indifference curve (U2) breathing cleaner air. WTA
is greater than WTP for a consumer whose preferences accord with the
standard economic model of consumer preferences.
FIGURE 1
Other
Goods
G2
G1 C B
G3
U2
A2  A1  Clear Air
W. Michael Hanemann"'° made this point in a recent article. He also
showed that the difference between WTA and WTP can become ex-
tremely large if the income effect is positive and the elasticity of substitu-
tion between clean air and other goods is very small. "If there is zero
substitutability between q and each of the private-market goods, it can
happen that, while the individual would only be willing to pay a finite
amount for an increase in q, there is no finite compensation that she
would accept to forgo this increase."' 10 In other words, if the elasticity
109. W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay Versus Willingness to Accept: How Much Can
They Differ?, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 635 (1991). See JASON F. SHOGREN ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL
SUPPORT FOR HANEMANN'S CONJECTURE ON THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN WTP AND WTA
MEASURES OF VALUE (Department of Economics, Iowa State University Working Paper No. 515,
July 1991) (containing supporting experimental data).
110. Haneman, supra note 109, at 637.
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of substitution between clean air and other goods was zero, a person
would be willing to pay nothing to obtain cleaner air, but he would de-
mand infinite compensation to relinquish it. This is true because an indi-
vidual with a zero elasticity of substitution is unwilling to substitute one
good for another if the consumer is to remain on the same indifference
curve. Thus, endowed with dirty air, the consumer will sacrifice no
amount of other goods to obtain cleaner air. Any sacrifice of other goods
would move the consumer to a lower indifference curve. In contrast,
endowed with clean air, no amount of other goods can compensate for a
deterioration in air quality since any sacrifice of air quality would move
the consumer to a lower indifference curve.
B. Prospect Theory and the Endowment Effect
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky developed prospect theory to
explain choice in risky situations.11 Kahneman and Tversky posited
that individuals have a "value function" defined with respect to the sta-
tus quo. 112 This value function is pictured in Figure 2, which indicates
that: (1) the value of the status quo is zero; (2) the value function for
gains is positive and concave; and (3) the value function for losses is neg-
ative, convex and more steeply sloped than the value function for gains.
111. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). Tversky and Kahneman recently formalized the prospect theory in
riskless situations. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kalneman, Loss Aversion In Riskless Choice: A Refer-
ence-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991). They also extended it to choice situations that
involve more than two options. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahmeman, Advances in Prospect Theory:
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992).
112. Recently Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler developed a theory of
business fairness based on deviations from the status quo. Daniel Kalneman et al., Fairness and the
Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. L. 285 (1986). See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 22, at
35 (discussing prospect theory under the heading of "cognitive misperceptions"). Yet the role for
misperception in prospect theory is unclear.
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FIGURE 2
Value
Loss Gains
This value function implies that a loss and a gain of equal size will not
produce equal amounts of pain and pleasure; the loss will be felt more
acutely.113 It also implies that a person will be risk averse regarding
gains and seek risk with respect to losses.114 Although prospect theory is
an ingenious way to explain choice in risky situations, we analyze only
whether it assists in explaining the disparity between WTA and WTP.115
First Thaler" 6 and then Kaneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1 7 adapted
prospect theory to explain why WTA is greater than WTP. The com-
113. Assuming concavity of the utility function also generates the prediction that losses will be
felt more acutely than gains. A concave utility function also creates the prediction that as an indi-
vidual becomes wealthier the marginal utility of gains and the marginal disutility of losses become
smaller.
114. This is a more extreme prediction which one could infer from concavity. A person with a
concave utility function is risk averse at every point.
115. Prospect theory has been strongly criticized. See Ranald R. Macdonald, Credible Concep-
tions and Implausible Probabilities, 39 BRIT. 3. MATH. & STAT. PSYCHOL. 15 (1986) (claiming that
Tversky and Kahneman utilized the wrong version of probability in interpreting their subjects' re-
sponses, mismodeled the problems posed to their subjects, and failed to give proper regard to the
ambiguous informational cues in the questions given to the subjects).
116. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
39 (1980); Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199
(1985).
117. Kahneman et al, supra note 64.
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mon theme is that losses have a larger impact than gains. Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler argued that this theme can help explain why WTA
exceeds WTP. 11s If an individual owns a good and is offered money to
relinquish it, he regards the potential sale as the loss of the good. If he
does not own the good, however, and is considering purchasing it, he
views the potential purchase as a gain of the good. Because losses loom
larger than gains, the individual will demand more to part with a good he
already owns than he will be willing to pay for the same good. In other
words, WTA exceeds WTP.
Richard Thaler also adapted prospect theory, suggesting that WTA
exceeds WTP because of the difference between "received income" and
"opportunity cost." In order to buy a good an individual must use out-
of-pocket money ("received income"). To keep a good he already owns,
an individual must spend money that he would have received had he sold
the good ("opportunity cost").1 19 Thaler claimed that people weigh re-
ceived income more than opportunity costs, and that this difference in
weighing causes people to "spend" opportunity costs more freely. Thus,
a person would be willing to pay more in opportunity cost to keep a good
that he already possesses than he would be willing to spend in received
income to acquire the good. As a consequence, WTA exceeds WTP.
Thaler referred "to the underweighing of opportunity costs as the endow-
ment effect." 1 20
Prospect theory and the endowment effect provide useful social-scien-
tific explanations for why WTA is greater than WTP. To use prospect
theory or the endowment effect in normative, legal analysis, however, a
search must commence for a more basic, deeper explanation. Such a
deeper explanation is centered on psychological needs or perhaps sociobi-
ological advantages of acting in accord with the prospect theory. For
example, a sociobiological theory is grounded upon possible survival ad-
vantages of treating gains and losses differently. Perhaps when humans
were hunter-gatherers, living at the edge of survival, significant losses
threatened death and thus the failure to transmit one's genes to the next
generation. Gains, on the other hand, might have produced no symmet-
rically greater chance of transmitting genes. Hence, from a genetic
standpoint, perhaps losses were more important than gains of equivalent
118. Id. at 1342-46.
119. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, supra note 116, at 44.
120. Id.
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size.12 1 This explains why humans might evolve so that their decision
making processes reflect a value function that is steeper for losses than
for equivalent gains.
One could also reconstruct prospect theory and the endowment effect
as a new explanation of why WTA exceeds WTP by relying on Margaret
Radin's adaptation of Hegel's theory of property.122 Radin posited that
property may become bound up with an individual's personality to such
an extent that the person regards the property as part of his self.123 Ex-
amples of such bound-up goods include one's wedding ring, favorite
clothes, paintings and other home furnishings, and, perhaps, a house it-
self. Before such a good is purchased it has no such status; it is merely a
fungible commodity. But after the good is acquired it may achieve
bound-up status.
Radin's observation assists in explaining why WTA exceeds WTP.
For example, if an individual, Ronald, seeks to buy a hat in the market-
place he regards hats as fungible commodities. He will be willing to pay
only up to a maximum amount, WTP, for the hat. On the other hand, if
Ronald already owns a hat, he will regard it as an expression of his per-
sonality. When another person, George, tries to buy that hat from Ron-
ald, he will view parting with the hat as relinquishing some of himself,
and therefore demand more money, WTA. Hence, this explains why
WTA exceeds WTP.
Radin's theory of property and personhood may explain the results
involving coffee mugs, pens,124 and perhaps the right not to taste SOA, 125
but it does not explain why experiments observed a difference between
WTA and WTP for securities that represent only the right to receive
121. An assumption of extreme risk aversion alone also will generate this prediction. Sociobio-
logical explanations of individual preference patterns are now part of mainstream economics. See
Ingemar Hansson & Charles Stuart, Malthusian Selection of Preferences, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 529
(1990).
122. Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). See Don L.
Coursey & William D. Schulze, The Application of Laboratory Experimental Economics to the Con-
tingent Valuation of Public Goods, 49 PUB. CHOICE 47, 55, 61 (1986) (proposing a similar theory).
For an experimental test, see Don L. Coursey et al., Fear and Loathing in the Coase Theorem:
Experimental Tests Involving Physical Discomfort, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 217 (1987). One could recast
Radin's theory as an argument about investment in consumption capital. Over time we learn how to
get the most pleasure from our consumption goods. When asked for our WTA for owned goods, we
include the value of new consumption capital needed to enjoy items that would replace the sold
goods.
123. Radin, supra note 122, at 959.
124. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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cash flows. Furthermore, in order for Radin's theory to explain the cof-
fee mugs, pens, and SOA experiments, the integration of marketplace
goods into one's personality must take place almost instantaneously, be-
cause in Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler's experiments the subjects
owned the goods for only a few minutes before the experimenters asked
them to reveal their WTA and WTP. 126
The endowment effect is problematic because in many circumstances it
is unclear whether a change in ownership is a gain or a loss.127 For ex-
ample, assume that a grandmother tells her devoted granddaughter that
when the grandmother dies she will leave her necklace to the grand-
daughter. Under endowment effect analysis, should the necklace be re-
garded as "owned" by the granddaughter while grandmother is still
alive? If someone offers immediately to pay the granddaughter cash in
exchange for the necklace when the grandmother dies, will the grand-
daughter demand WTA? On the other hand, is the necklace considered
as not yet acquired, so that the granddaughter will demand less? The
answers are unclear. Alternatively, assume that a person enters into a
favorable contract to buy a car from a dealership, with delivery due in
one month. Before the dealer delivers the car, the dealer goes bankrupt
and the contract is canceled. Will the denied car buyer regard the car as
a loss or as a foregone gain?
C. Closing Transactions
Mark Kelman suggested that people view an exchange as a psychologi-
cal unit, and that they need to complete these psychological units by
finishing transactions.1 2 He concluded that this explains why people fail
to ignore sunk costs. Kelman used an example of someone who paid
$100 to join a tennis club, developed a bad elbow, but continued to play
with the pain even though he would not play tennis if he had not paid the
126. Kahneman et al., supra note 64. Outside the experimental laboratory one might observe an
endowment effect as a consequence of the tax system. A person in the 30% marginal income tax
bracket must earn $10 of gross income to purchase a good that sells for $70. Assume that he is only
willing to pay $70 to purchase it and that he does buy the item. Given that he now owns the good,
he would require $70 in after tax dollars to replace the good. If his tax basis in the good is less than
$70, then any that he receives over $70 is capital gain which is taxed at ordinary income rates under
the current tax regime. Hence, to produce $70 in after tax dollars, the consumer must be paid more
than $70 for the good. Thus, he should not be willing to accept $70 to sell the good.
127. In this context, see Peregrine Schwartz-Shea & Randy T. Simmons, Social Dilemmas and
Perceptions: Experiments on Framing and Inconsequentiality, in SoCIAL DILEMMAS (David Schroe-
der ed., forthcoming).
128. Kelman, supra note 13, at 691-93.
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$100 to play tennis.129 According to traditional utility theory, this con-
sumer acted irrationally because $100 is a sunk cost, which he cannot
recoup and which is irrelevant to his future decisions. Kelman posited
that the need to "close" transactions explains the consumer's irrational
behavior. "Consumers try to 'close' transactions: [he spent] $100... on
tennis, and the consumer want[ed] $100 of tennis value."13
Furthermore, Kelman claimed that the need to close transactions also
helps to explain why WTA exceeds WTP. Once a person has acquired a
good, he has closed the transaction. When someone later offers to buy
the good, the person must consider reopening the closed transaction."' 1
The psychological need to close transactions, however, militates against
reopening the transaction. The psychic cost of reopening an already
closed transaction is compensated only if the person receives a larger
price for sale of the good than he paid. In contrast, when the same per-
son considers buying the same good, no transaction yet exists, and hence
no psychic costs are associated with making an offer for the good. As a
result, Kelman concluded that WTA exceeds WTP.
Kelman's theory provides a good starting point to illustrate some, but
not all, of the results reviewed in this Article. The theory is most persua-
sive when explaining results involving consumer items, such as coffee
mugs or pens, where consumers habitually purchase the item, consume
it, and do not resell it. The theory appears to lose persuasiveness when
applied to securities, which are acquired for the instrumental purpose of
making money, possibly by reselling the security if that seems most prof-
itable. But even in the case of consumer items, Kelman's theory applies
to the experimental settings only if the experimental gifts of coffee mugs
and pens represent closed transactions.
Outside of the experimental setting, Kelman's theory is difficult to util-
ize. To use Kelman's theory, one needs a precise definition of "transac-
tion," as well as an appropriate way to distinguish whether the
transaction is closed or open. For example, assume that Ronald offered
to buy a hat from George for $10.00 and George replied that he would
"think it over." Under basic contract law doctrines, Ronald and George
have formed no agreement. Yet, this does not determine whether or not
Ronald has entered into a psychological transaction with George to sell
the hat. If Ronald has entered into a psychological transaction, he may
129. Id. at 691.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 692.
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feel required to close the deal. If this is the case, after a day or two he
should be willing to offer more money to close the transaction. Even if
one somehow knew whether Ronald had entered into a "transaction"
one would also need to know how to distinguish between closed and open
transactions. For example, if George agreed to sell Ronald the hat, when
would the transaction close? The deal might close at the time of the
agreement, or when George delivers the hat, or perhaps not until Ronald
inspects the hat for defects and formally accepts it. Kelman's closing
transaction theory uses intuitive answers to these questions.
D. Value (or Preference) Uncertainty
Ronald Heiner proposed a theory which has implications for under-
standing the disparity between WTA and WTP.132 He suggested that if
preferences are uncertain, information is unreliable, or an individual's
ability to process information is unpredictable, then economic agents
tend to develop behavioral rules of thumb and institutions will generate
predictable economic outcomes despite the underlying uncertainty.133
Sometimes these predictable economic outcomes appear to result because
agents behave "as if" they were making maximizing decisions, but other
times they do not. Heiner focused on one nonmaximizing outcome
which the literature by Arrow134 and Kunreuther also discussed,13 and
which McClelland and Schulze studied in their experiments.136 In this
well-documented choice anomaly, people will insure against relatively
high probability hazards, at actuarially fair prices, but will either not
insure against very low probability hazards even at extremely favorable
prices, or pay more than an actuarially fair price. For example, people
must be subsidized to buy flood insurance in places where floods are rela-
tively rare. In their studies, McClelland, Schulze and Coursey found
that mean bids for insurance generally equaled the expected value of the
loss when the loss probabilities fell between twenty percent and ninety
132. Ronald A. Heiner, The Origin of Predictable Behavior, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 560 (1983).
133. Id. at 561.
134. Kenneth J. Arrow, Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics, 20 EON. INQUIRY 1
(1981).
135. HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., DISASTER INSURANCE (1978).
136. McClelland & Schulze, supra note 92; see also Gary H. McClelland, William D. Schulze &
Brian Hurd, The Effect of Risk Beliefs on Property Values: A Case Study of a Hazardous Waste Site,
10 RISK ANALYSIS 485 (1990); Gary H. McClelland, William D. Schulze & Don L. Coursey, Valu-
ing Low Probability Hazards. Experimental Evidence for a Bi-modal Response to Unlikely Events, J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY (forthcoming).
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percent. At a loss probability of one percent, however, twenty-five per-
cent of the subjects bid zero and almost as many subjects bid double the
expected loss value.
Richard Bishop, Thomas Heberlein and Mary Jo Kealy suggested one
way in which preference uncertainty might lead to a divergence between
WTA and WTP. 137 They claimed that when people are asked about
WTA, they want to "play it safe," so they state amounts that are very
high. 38 By stating a high WTA, respondents select an amount "at
which they are relatively certain they really would sell." 139 However,
this theory also fails to explain the persistence of why WTA exceeds
WTP in a market setting because it does not explain how people resolve
the uncertainty when they tender a genuine final offer. Unless this mech-
anism resolves uncertainty differently for buying and selling, the theory
cannot explain the experimental results.
E. Prospect Theory, Regret Theory and Value Uncertainty
William Rankin combined regret theory, adaptive utility theory, and
prospect theory into a single utility function in an effort to describe the
disparity between WTA and WTP.140 Regret theory, initially developed
by Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden,1 41 posits that an individual
makes a choice that ultimately produces a result. An individual's utility
value depends not only on this result, but also on what the result would
have been if he had chosen differently. If the result from a different
choice would have been better than the result from the choice actually
made, the individual feels regret. If the result from a different choice
would have been worse than the result from the choice actually made,
the individual rejoices. For example, assume that an individual must
choose between buying stock A or stock B. The individual purchases
stock A and the value of stock A rises, but the value of stock B increases
137. Richard C. Bishop et al., Contingent Valuation of Environmental Assets: Comparisons with
a Simulated Market, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 619 (1983).
138. Id. at 629.
139. Id. See also Ronald A. Heiner, Experimental Economics: Comment, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
260 (March 1985) (proposing that experimental economics be formulated to test theories with value
uncertainty).
140. William F. Rankin, Reconciling Willingness to Pay/Willingness to Accept Disparities (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan).
141. Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational
Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805 (1982); Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Disappoint-
ment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice Under Uncertainty, 53 REv. ECON. STUD. 271 (1986),
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a greater amount. The individual will receive utility from the apprecia-
tion in the value of stock A, but he will also regret not purchasing stock
B. On the other hand, if the value of stock B decreases, the individual
would receive utility from the rise in the value of stock A, and rejoice
because he did not purchase stock B.
Adaptive utility theory, as developed by Richard Cyert and Morris
DeGroot, allows individuals to be somewhat uncertain about their pref-
erences. 142 As individuals participate in the market, they gain informa-
tion about their preferences and adapt their behavior to this new
information.
Rankin combined adaptive utility theory with regret theory by making
preference uncertainty the only source of regret or joy. One may suffer
regret ("I could have had a V8!") or rejoice ("It could be worse") caused
by the resolution of uncertainty about one's preferences. As the individ-
ual eliminates uncertainty about his preferences, he eliminates the possi-
bility of regret or joy.
Finally, Rankin combined prospect theory and regret theory by estab-
lishing the status quo as the comparison point for the regret portion of
his theory and by assuming that suffering regret is more important than
rejoicing. 43 These assumptions produce the "kink" in the utility func-
tion at the status quo, at least as long as the individual is uncertain about
his preferences. The kinked utility function produces a WTA that is
greater than WTP. However, as the individual engages in market trans-
actions, learns his own utility function, and eliminates the source of un-
certainty, WTA converges to WTP.14
Rankin's derivation that WTA exceeds WTP is directly dependent on
prospect theory. By attaching prospect theory's kinked utility function
to adaptive utility and regret theory, Rankin hoped to separate the situa-
tions in which WTA exceeded WTP from those in which WTA equaled
WTP. Rankin argued that nonmarket goods are in the first category,
while market goods are in the latter. Unfortunately, the correspondence
between the two pairs of categories is unclear. In Rankin's formulation,
142. Richard M. Cyert & Morris H. DeGroot, Adaptive Utility, in ADAPTIVE ECONOMIC MOD-
ELS 223-46 (R. H. Day & T. Groves eds., 1975); RICHARD M. CYERT & MORRIs H. DEGROOT,
LEARNING APPLIED TO UTILITY FUNCTIONS, BAYESIAN ANALYSIS IN ECONOMETRICS AND STA-
TISTICS 159-68 (Arnold Zellner ed., 1980).
143. Rankin gave no weight to rejoicing in his formulation, but any formulation that weighted
regret more than rejoicing would produce the same result.
144. Rankin, supra note 140, at 117-19.
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WTA is greater than WTP because of preference uncertainty; but some
of the experiments uncover the disparity even for common consumer
items (such as candy bars or coffee mugs) and simple securities. Further-
more, some of the repeated participation in markets that appears to push
WTA toward WTP does not involve repeated sampling of the result that
would squeeze out preference uncertainty. 145
Despite these shortcomings, Rankin's approach is sound. It properly
explains why WTA exceeds WTP in some situations, and it also appro-
priately explains why WTA and WTP will converge in some situations.
To his credit, Rankin did not claim that his theory explains the disparity
in all situations. Where it does apply, Rankin's approach is useful. To
address the disparity in other situations, however, other explanations are
necessary.
F. Explanations Suggesting True WTA Equals WTP
1. Misrepresentation
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler suggested one possibility that may ex-
plain why true WTA equals WTP: individuals habitually misstate WTA
as greater than WTP because in many contexts they are rewarded for this
misstatement.1 46 As a result, these habits spill over into contexts where
no such rewards exist. If this explanation has validity, WTA should
move closer to WTP in a market setting. Once the subject is confronted
with a genuine final offer in a real market, gains from misrepresentation
no longer exist. 147
As discussed above,1 48 evidence on convergence in a market setting is
mixed. Coursey, Hovis and Schulze and Knez, Smith and Williams con-
cluded that WTA and WTP do converge when the good in question is
the right to avoid tasting the SOA-the bitter tasting liquid in Coursey,
Hovis and Schulze's experiment-or a security.14 9 Kahneman, Knetsch
and Thaler, however, arrived at the opposite conclusion when the trans-
action involved small consumer goods.1 50 McClelland and Schulze
145. Eg., Coursey et al., supra note 23 (subjects did not have to taste the SOA in each experi-
mental market round).
146. Kahneman et al., supra note 64, at 1336. They attributed this theory to Knez et al., supra
note 84, at 398.
147. Some of the strategy, however, might be preserved if people bargain over an asset with
unknown value.
148. See Part II B.
149. Coursey et al., supra note 23, at 688; Knez et al., supra note 84.
150. Kahneman et al., supra note 64.
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found that WTA converges quickly to WTP for uncertain gains, but does
not converge at all for uncertain losses.151 Boyce et al. concluded that
WTA converges "close" to WTP when the transaction involved a tree
that will not be destroyed, but does not converge at all for a tree that will
be destroyed if not sold or purchased.
152
2. Experimenters Frame Questions Incorrectly
In hypothetical surveys, respondents might legitimately interpret
WTA and WTP questions as seeking different responses. For example,
suppose an individual has a normal downward-sloping demand for a
good, as shown in Figure 3. When asked his willingness to pay, thinking
of some number of units being sold, the individual responds with the
lower, shaded rectangle. This is the amount that he would have to pay to
obtain the good in a competitive market. On the other hand, when asked
his willingness to accept compensation, the individual responds with the
entire consumer's surplus over those units (the area under the demand
curve). This total includes the shaded rectangle and the cross-hatched
upper triangle. While this area also represents the true maximum will-
ingness to pay, the individual either does not interpret the WTP question
as asking for consumer's surplus or he does not want to reveal to the
surveyor his maximum willingness to pay.
FIGURE 3$Price
Deand
Quantity
151. McClelland & Schulze, supra note 92.
152. Boyce et al., supra note 53.
19931
6
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While this explanation may help elucidate why survey responses to WTA
and WTP questions sometimes differ, it also creates problems in inter-
preting those differences. First, in many surveys it is not clear in what
units the experimenters denominated a good. Therefore, the surveyor
may ask the subject the question for WTA and WTP over one unit, while
the subject may interpret the question in terms of multiple units. If each
individual assumes a different number of units, there is no comparability.
Second, their explanation does not offer a conclusion regarding why sub-
jects decreased WTA over the course of Coursey, Hovis and Schulze's
auctions153 or why they believed WTA was equal to WTP in McClelland
and Schulze's WTA/gain auctions.154 Why would subjects interpret the
questions differently in one WTA experiment and similarly in another?
Finally, this explanation fails to explain Knetsch and Sinden's experi-
ments in which many fewer transactions than anticipated actually
resulted.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In this section, this Article discusses two different types of implications
(positive and normative) that result from the WTA and WTP experi-
ments. The positive implications center on differences in observed behav-
ior. 55 The differential between WTA and WTP may suggest that both
Coasian bargaining and organized markets operate differently than origi-
nally believed. The normative implications address the options that pol-
icy makers believe society ought to choose.
A. Positive Implications
L The Coase Theorem
In two-person bargaining situations, WTA exceeding WTP would tend
153. Coursey et al., supra note 23, at 685-86.
154. McClelland & Schulze, supra note 92.
155. In an excellent article, Lewis Kornhauser noted that WTA>WTP has occupied the center
of the Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") assault on positive predictions of law and economics. Lewis
A. Kornhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36 STAN. L. REV. 349, 358-60 (1984).
This assault has had less impact than its authors, particularly Kelman, might have hoped
for, because most economists regard the offer/asking price problem as a minor anomaly
with which economics will eventually cope. After all, the offer/asking price problem arises
not at a theoretical level but at a level of application. For any initial allocation of endow-
ments, one can, in theory, calculate the resulting allocations of goods and services.
Id. at 360.
Regardless of whether WTA exceeds WTP is a minor anomaly, Kornhauser correctly concluded
that one can compute market outcomes, given starting points. This Article does exactly that.
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to reduce the number of voluntary trades. Specifically, if two parties bar-
gained over a right, and if each party's WTA exceeded the other party's
WTP, no trade would occur. In such a situation, a buyer is unable to
offer enough money to persuade the owner to give up the right. For
example, assume that George owned a hat and Ronald wanted to buy it.
Further assume that George's WTA is $15.00, but his WTP is only
$10.00, whereas Ronald's WTP is $11.00 and his WTA is $16.00. At
most, Ronald would offer $11.00 (his maximum WTP), while George
would accept no less than $15.00 (his minimum WTA). Consequently,
Ronald and George will not trade. On the other hand, if Ronald owned
the hat, he would accept no less than $16.00 (his minimum WTA), while
George would offer no more than $10.00 (his maximum WTP). Based
on these WTA and WTP values for both parties, the right to the hat is
"sticky"-it will stick with whichever party originally owned it.1 16
However, a profit-maximizing entrepreneur might significantly alter
this scenario. Assume that Geraldine knows George's and Ronald's
WTA and WTP. If Ronald owned the hat, Geraldine could do nothing
to make money. But if George owned the hat, Geraldine could pay
George $15.00 (his minimum WTA), allow Ronald to use the hat as if he
owned it, and then later threaten to take the hat away from him. If al-
lowing Ronald to use the hat raised his valuation of the hat from WTP to
WTA (and some explanations, particularly the version of the endowment
effect suggested by Radin's work,157 suggest that it would), then Geral-
dine could receive $16.00 (Ronald's minimum WTA) in exchange for the
hat. In this way Geraldine could make a profit and, regardless of who
originally owned the hat, Ronald would ultimately own it. Furthermore,
if George knew what Geraldine knew and if he had the same en-
trepreneurial skills, he could execute Geraldine's strategy himself.
Hence, this simple scenario may restore the Coase Theorem's invariance
result.
2 Markets
Recall that our simple model of organized markets utilizes supply and
demand curves. The supply curve represents a graph of all the units that
would be supplied in the market at each possible price. The demand
156. See Jack L. Knetsch, Legal Rules and the Basis for Evaluating Economic Losses, 4 INT'L
REv. L. & EcoN. 5, 10 (1984) (recognizing that rights are likely to remain where they are originally
assigned because of transaction problems).
157. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
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curve represents a graph of all the units that would be demanded at each
possible price. Consider the situation, depicted in Figure 4, in which two
individuals, A and B, are exchanging goods for money. The vertical axis
represents the good's unit price and the horizontal axis represents units
of the good. Qt represents the total amount of the goods available for
exchange. At point "0" on the horizonal axis, B owns all of the goods.
Movements to the right along the horizontal axis represent transfers
from B to A. At Qt on the horizontal axis, A owns all of the goods.
Movements from Qt to the left along the horizontal axis represent trans-
fers from A to B. The baseline condition, in which WTA equals WTP at
every quantity for both A and B is represented by the curves
WTPA=WTAA and WTAB= WTPB. The graph is set up with A as the
buyer and B as the seller, but since WTP equals WTA for each person,
the roles could be reversed without changing the outcome. 158 Regardless
of who initially owns the good, ultimately A will own QA units and B will
own QB units. Pc will represent the price for the units exchanged, re-
gardless of who is buying and who is selling.
158. Each curve in Figure 4 represents the rate at which each individual is willing to exchange
goods for money. Starting at point 0 on the quantity axis, person A has money, but no goods. Person
B has all the goods, but little money. Similarly, starting at Qr on the quantity axis, B has money, but
no goods. Person A has all the goods, but little money. Person A's demand curve for goods declines
from the left, while his supply curve rises from the right. Person B's demand curve for goods de-
clines from the right, while his supply curve rises from the left. At the point of equilibrium (Q,,P,),
supply equals demand from either market perspective.
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FIGURE 4
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Now, suppose that WTAA exceeds WTPA and WTAB is greater than
WTPB. This situation is depicted in Figure 5. The dashed WTP lines
represent the baseline case illustrated in Figure 5 (WTA=WTP) and the
solid WTA lines illustrate the effect of a WTA greater than WTP. View-
ing the graph from left to right, A is the buyer, with the dashed demand
curve WTPA. B is the seller, with solid supply curve WTAB. Now the
equilibrium exchange shows B selling only QA'< QA units to A at a
higher price (PA> P,)- Similarly, viewing the graph from right to left, B
is the buyer, with the dashed demand curve WTPB. A is the seller, with
solid supply curve WTAA. Now the equilibrium exchange shows A sell-
ing only QB' < QB to B at a price of PB > Pe. Thus A will ultimately own
more of the goods, relative to the baseline case, if he owned all of the
goods initially. Similarly, B ultimately owns more if he originally owned
all of the goods. The final allocation of the good is not invariant to the
initial distribution of rights. PA might be greater than, less than, or equal
to PB. But, both prices will be higher than Pe as long as demand is down-
ward sloping (supply upward sloping) for both individuals. Thus, in gen-
eral, fewer units are transferred at a higher price if WTA exceeds WTP.
These results-higher prices with fewer units transferred from owners-
Washington University Open Scholarship
102 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
assume that the buyer and seller are price takers. If they are price seek-
ers, one could reinvent the Ronald/George/Geraldine scenario (involv-
ing the sale of a hat) previously discussed.159 The price taking
assumption seems appropriate, however, for extending these results to
markets.
FIGURE 5
$
PriceWTAB
PA/
pB
Pe 
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The above discussion involving only two individuals extends immediately
to competitive markets simply by considering the individual supply and
demand curves as market supply and demand curves. There are, how-
ever, two caveats. First, in a market, the WTA and WTP of the marginal
market participants determine the equilibrium price and quantity. Thus,
in a competitive market, it is possible for some participants to have WTA
exceeding WTP without affecting market prices or transactions. As long
as a sufficiently large number of participants have a WTA that equals
WTP for prices and quantities in the vicinity of the equilibrium, one
might not observe a reluctance to trade from market data. If the margi-
nal participants exhibit a reluctance to trade, however, the situation de-
picted in Figure 5 could result. Second, this analysis assumes that WTA
159. See supra Part IV.A1.
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exceeds WTP on both sides of the market. However, in many markets
for new consumer goods this assumption is probably incorrect. Assume
that in most transactions sellers are firms, with WTA equal to WTP,
while buyers are individuals. Hence, only the firms' WTP (which is
equal to WTA) curve, and the individuals' WTP (which is less than
WTA) curve are important. Consequently, Figure 5 would not apply.
But in other markets, such as the residential real estate market, individu-
als appear in great numbers on both sides of the market. In these mar-
kets the analysis in Figure 5 applies.
Understanding the disparity between WTA and WTP may also gener-
ate more sophisticated analyses of "political markets." A rapidly grow-
ing segment of political science analyzes politics from a rational choice
perspective. Voters, political representatives, bureaucrats and interest
groups all maximize their own welfare, subject to institutional con-
straints. 1" Virtually all of the studies in this area use some form of the
expected utility theory as the basis for human decision making. If gains
and losses are viewed differently, at least by voters, the implications for
the analysis of politics are potentially tremendous. Roger Noll and
James Krier's recent article represents the first tentative steps in this di-
rection.161 Their article attempts to gain insight into the politics of risk
regulation, when voters are presumed to care more about losses than
gains. One could extend such analysis to explain the particular political
salience of military base or factory closings (as opposed to failing to open
military bases or factories), increases in the unemployment rate, and
many other issues.
B. Normative Implications
This section speculates on more general normative implications of
160. Michael E. Levine, Revisionism Revised: Airline Deregulation and the Public Interest, 44 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (Winter 1981); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory
Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 177
(Special Issue 1990); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989); DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); Matthew L. Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism
and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1293
(1988).
For a theory of bias in favor of the status quo at the societal level that does not rely on WTA
exceeding WTP in individuals, see Raquel Fernandez & Dani Rodrik, Resistance to Reform: Status
Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 1146 (1991).
161. See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk
Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990); Matthew L. Spitzer, Comment on Noll and Krier, Some
Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1990).
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WTA exceeding WTP, suggesting that these implications may be ex-
tremely important.
1. Resolving Disputes About Rights and Damages
The courts must often determine which side of a dispute has the legal
right to engage in a particular activity. For example, if a homeowner
sued a smelter for polluting the air, the court would have to determine
whether the smelter had the right to pollute or whether the homeowner
had the right to clean air before the court could decide whether to issue
an injunction 62 or to award damages. 163
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed have suggested that courts
should resolve such disputes by estimating the level of pollution that
maximizes the net social benefits and then assigning the rights so as to
minimize the transaction costs associated with enforcing that level of pol-
lution. Net social benefits are estimated by subtracting the smelter's cost
of reducing pollution from the homeowner's benefits of reduced pollu-
tion. Net benefits are maximized when the marginal cost of further pol-
lution reduction exactly equals the marginal benefit of further pollution
reduction. 164
The possibility that WTA exceeds WTP is generally nonexistent in this
analysis. Which value should a court use when WTA is greater than
WTP to determine the homeowner's benefit of reduced pollution? The
answer is crucial because it may determine which side will receive the
right. For example, consider a situation in which air pollution is de-
162. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
163. Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
164. Thus, Calabresi and Melamed would argue that if the air is highly polluted and if it would
be difficult for homeowners to reach a private agreement with the smelter to reduce pollution, then
the court should grant the right to clean air to the homeowners and then determine and enforce a
damage assessment scheme. If there are many homeowners and only one smelter, however, it might
reduce transaction costs to grant the homeowners the right to clean air and make the smelter pay,
even if the pollution is moderate. On the other hand, if pollution is moderate and there is only one
affected homeowner who has recently moved into the area, the court might grant the smelter the
right to pollute and let the homeowner pay the smelter to reduce pollution. Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 8, at 1106-07. See also Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model
of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985); POLINSKY, supra note 8, at 93-95.
If wealth effects associated with different distributions of rights are small, and if transactions costs
are vanishingly small, then the Coase Theorem predicts that any distribution of rights will lead to a
level of pollution which maximizes net benefits. However, transactions costs associated with differ-
ential bargaining power, with strategic behavior, or with information costs might make it easier and
more efficient to reach the pollution level which maximizes net benefits by assigning rights to the
appropriate party.
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scribed in parts per million ("ppm"). Assume that the air is currently
heavily polluted (1000 ppm), and the court must decide whether the
smelter should install scrubbers to reduce pollution to 100 ppm and com-
pensate the homeowner for past pollution. Now suppose that the home-
owner would require (WTA) $1000 to accept that reduction in air quality
if the air quality was originally 100 ppm, but that he would only be will-
ing to pay (WTP) $100 to effect that reduction in pollution if the air
quality was initially 1000 ppm. Further assume that the smelter will in-
cur $500 in costs to install the scrubbers.
If the smelter has the right to pollute, then the cost of reducing pollu-
tion ($500) is greater than the benefit ($100). Thus, the court should not
require the smelter to install scrubbers and should not award compensa-
tion to the homeowner. The net benefit of installing scrubbers is - $400
($100-$500). Conversely, if the homeowner owns the legal right to
clean air, and if the legal right controls the choice of value, then the net
benefit of reduced pollution is $500 ($1000-$500) and the court should
order the smelter to install scrubbers. Moreover, the homeowner has in-
curred real damages equal to the cost of pollution control in the past.
Which analysis is correct? Neither articulation is correct unless one
knows the allocation of rights a priori. Yet, the valuation of net benefits
is often part of the process of determining rights a priori. Such an analy-
sis is therefore circular when WTA exceeds WTP. 165
This circuitous analysis hobbles legal doctrines that rely on estimates
of net benefits. For example, when accidents produce damages, tort law
frequently uses the negligence rule to allocate losses. One version of the
negligence rule asks whether a defendant could have taken cost-justified
steps to avoid the accident: if the defendant could have taken steps to
avoid the accident such that the cost of prevention would have been less
than the expected savings in accident costs, then the defendant is negli-
gent and must pay for the plaintiff's damages.166
165. See Kennedy, supra note 13; Hovenkamp, supra note 13 (containing proofs that implicitly
extend value-maximization to a comparison of the sum of state-contingent values). In the
smelter/homeowner example, Hovenkamp's procedure would assign the rights to the homeowner,
for WTA=$1000, the largest contingent value for the rights. What remains unanswered is why one
should compare the state-contingent values as a welfare criterion. Hovenkamp proceeds to show
that WTA > WTP introduces many other problems for the use of his reformulated version of wealth
maximization. Id. at 245-46.
166. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 160 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.
1947).
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This negligence rule is more easily understood with an example. In the
famous case of Bolton v. Stone,1 67 Bessie Stone was hit on the head by a
cricket ball that was hit over the fence at a cricket club located across the
street from her residence.168 The batsman's blow was quite unusual since
only a few balls had ever been hit out of the park before. 169 Ms. Stone
sued the club, claiming that its failure to put up a higher fence consti-
tuted negligence. 170 In effect, Ms. Stone claimed that the club's cost of
installing a higher fence would have been less than the expected reduc-
tion in accident costs to those standing in their front yards across the
street from the club. Ms. Stone contended that because the club was
negligent it should pay her medical expenses and other costs associated
with her injury. To answer Ms. Stone's claim, the court compared the
club's cost of installing a higher fence with the expected accident cost
savings that a higher fence would prevent by catching cricket balls in the
fence before they exited the club.' 71
The potential disparity between WTA and WTP adds a crucial ele-
ment of moral ambiguity into the court's negligence calculus. To see
this, assume that the cricket club would incur $100 in costs to install a
higher fence, and that Ms. Stone was willing to pay only $50 to be free of
the cricket ball risk eliminated by the higher fence, but that she would
demand $150 to agree to the imposition of such risk. If the court used
the WTP values, then the club would not be negligent since $100 is
greater than the expected benefit of $50: Ms. Stone would have no claim
against the cricket club. On the other hand, if the court used the WTA
values, the court would find that the club could have avoided $150 of
expected harm by spending only $100: clearly a cost-justified expenditure
on accident avoidance. The club would have been negligent and liable to
Bessie Stone. The crucial question then becomes: should the court use
WTA or WTP figures when resolving the negligence issue? Unfortu-
nately, there is no easy or obviously correct answer.' 72
167. Stone v. Bolton, [1950] 1 K.B. 201 (C.A.); Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850.
168. Stone, 1 K.B. at 202.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 205-08.
172. Richard S. Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost/Benefit Analysis and the Determination of
Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1169 (1984) (suggesting that cost/benefit analysis is inappro-
priate in situations where rights-based norms, such as fairness, justice, or settled expectations, deter-
mine allocations of rights). Hence, cost/benefit analysis will be of little value in judicial settings.
But in legislative, and perhaps administrative settings, cost/benefit analysis may be useful, possibly
in conjunction with other normative approaches, to make social policy. Markovits resolved the
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Jack Knetsch suggests resolving the moral ambiguity by assigning spe-
cial status to the benefits enjoyed by people in the status quo.1 73 He
posits that if people are currently enjoying clean air, water, or access to
sunshine, then any net benefit assessment should use WTA figures, re-
gardless of whether the people enjoy the legal right to these benefits. He
states that one should discount the value of the resources they currently
enjoy by the probability that they can continue to enjoy them. "The wel-
fare associated with any set of expectations and entitlements will likely,
all other things equal, reflect their security; more tenuous ones will be
discounted relative to ones more certain of protection." 74 Thus, if a
court is unlikely to uphold the legal right to enjoy the resource, then the
value of enjoying the right should be discounted.
Knetsch's reference to "expectations and entitlements" injects ambigu-
ity into the analysis. If one focuses on "entitlements," then Knetsch's
resolution of the problem is essentially the "property rights" solution de-
scribed above. Instead of determining whether the claimants have a legal
right to use a resource that may be withdrawn (and using the WTA value
if they have a legal right, the WTP value if they do not), Knetsch would
presumably compute the probabilities of the alternative legal outcomes,
multiply the WTA and WTP values by their probabilities, and then add
these numbers to determine the value of the rights. In essence, Knetsch's
value is grounded in whether the claimants have a legal right to the re-
source that they currently enjoy, but the right's value is discounted for
problem of WTA > WTP, at least as far as the disparity is generated by wealth effects, by evaluating
a move from policy A to policy B in the following manner. He used WTP in state B for losers, and
WTA in state B for gainers. Id. at 1179. He contended that this meets the expectations of policy-
makers and members of the public. Id. at 1180. These figures will match actual values if the change
is made because no compensation will actually take place. Id. at 1180-81. Markovits claimed that
this is the only "'correct, nonarbitrary' way to measure the equivalent dollar benefits and costs that
a policy will generate." Id. at 1182.
It is not clear why Markovits' approach is correct or nonarbitrary, although it may actually match
the expectations of policymakers and the general public. The numbers that his approach generates
may match the values that the individuals will hold if the move from A to B is effected, but why
these are the normatively relevant figures is unclear. One could also easily argue that the numbers
obtained with wealth levels in state of the world A are relevant, because the cost/benefit analysis is
done before any change is made. In addition, Markovits claimed that his suggestion disposes of
normative questions stemming from WTA>WTP, regardless of whether the disparity arises from
wealth effects or from other psychological causes. Id. at 1178. Even if one accepts Markovits'
approach to the wealth effects issue, it does not necessarily follow that the normative issues stem-
ming from other sources of WTA>WTP can be addressed in the identical manner.
173. Knetsch, supra note 156, at 11-12.
174. Id. at 11.
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risk of loss. This theory, however, has the same basic problem we noted
above. If one must rely on who has the right before commencing the cost
analysis, then the process is circular.
However, if one focuses on "expectations," then Knetsch's theory is
quite different. Knetsch claims that policy analysis and legal decisions
should turn on values implied by individuals' true beliefs about the status
quo, regardless of legal rules.'1 5 Such an approach might have promise,
but it will face both practical and normative problems. On the practical
side, it may be difficult to get disputants to reveal their honest beliefs
about the status quo when they know that their rights or wealth depend
upon their answers. 176 In addition, conflicting, inconsistent beliefs about
the status quo exist. Should the analyst or judge prefer one or another of
the beliefs, or construct a new, artificial belief based upon those honestly
held by the involved parties? If the analyst or judge must choose the
beliefs of one of the parties, then he must do so based upon a foundation
other than the legal rights of the parties, lest the solution again become
circular. 177 This requires a moral theory that explains why one ought to
respect a particular view of the status quo. Such a moral theory might
point to a particular view of the status quo that is not held by anyone-in
effect requiring the analyst or judge to construct a new, artificial belief.
This conclusion points out the inexorable link between practical and nor-
mative problems. Considering how to privilege certain beliefs over
others requires an explanation regarding why one ought to consider any
beliefs about the status quo. If there is a good reason to reject all beliefs
about the status quo as unreasonable, then perhaps one should refuse to
use such beliefs as the basis for a cost/benefit analysis that will support
policy recommendations or judicial decisions.
The disparity between WTA and.WTP may also figure into other ar-
guments. In a recent working paler Knetsch and David Cohen contend
that the common law, as well as some statutes, reflect the insight that
175. Jack L. Knetsch, Environmental Policy Implications of Disparities Between Willingness to
Pay and Compensation Demanded Measures of Values, 18 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 227, 235
(1990) (taking exactly this position).
176. See Allan Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41 ECONOMETRICA
587 (1973); Mark A. Satterthwaite, Strategy-Proofness and 4rrow's Conditions: Existence and Corre-
spondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, 10 J. ECON. THEORY 187
(1975); Theodore Groves & John Ledyard, Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: .4 Solution to the
"Free-Rider Problem," 45 EcONOMETRICA 783-809 (1977).
177. If legal rights imply beliefs about the status quo, which imply values, which in turn imply
legal rights, then a circuitous causation exists.
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WTA exceeds WTP.178 Legal rules can be understood, they claim, as
attempts to maximize fairness or efficiency, given the disparity between
WTA and WTP.
Cohen and Knetsch's argument can be refined using this Article's in-
sights. They build an argument based upon the presumption that WTA
exceeds WTP in all places, for all people, and at all times. Thus, they
"explain" and justify the law of adverse possession, 179 recovery of lost
profits in tort and contract, 180 contract modifications, 181 gratuitous
promises, 182 opportunistic conduct in contractual performance or negoti-
ation,18 3 and repossession,184 with reference to the same disparity be-
tween WTA and WTP. However, some of the parties are individuals,
while others are corporations. In addition, the subject matter of the dis-
putes that Cohen and Knetsch reviewed range from extremely personal
items (such as jewelry or furniture) to completely fungible items (such as
aluminum ore or money).1 85 The evidence reviewed above suggests that
the disparity between WTA and WTP may vary widely between these
cases. Consequently, Cohen and Knetsch's analysis should either explain
how the law tracks the disparity variations, or else explain why the law
fails to do so.
A similar critique applies to the most prominent attacks upon
cost/benefit analysis. Duncan Kennedy and Mark Kelman advance
many of the same arguments previously discussed based upon the pre-
sumption that WTA is greater than WTP. They suggest that
cost/benefit analysis lacks legitimacy. 8 6 However, their analysis rests
upon a rather blunt notion that WTA exceeds WTP, without any notion
of the limitations of the evidence on that question. Moreover, the legal
178. The disparity between WTA and WTP may also figure in other arguments. See DAVID
COHEN & JACK L. KNETSCH, JUDICIAL CHOICE AND DIsPARmEs BETWEEN MEASURES OF ECO-
NOMIC VALUES (Simon Fraser University Working Paper, 1990).
179. Cohen & Knetsch are deliberately unclear about exactly what determines expectations
about the status quo. They also exhibit a strongly positive flavor in their paper. They devote a great
deal of effort to trying to demonstrate that the courts have decided disputes in accord with their
theory of fairness; they assert that when this fact is understood many of the "puzzles" of law can be
explained. Any rights-protecting theory should appear to protect the status quo. A theory of how to
identify the rights by using WTA exceeds WTP would make Cohen and Knetsch's paper conclusive.
180. COHEN & KNETCH, supra note 178, at 18-21.
181. Id at 21-22.
182. Id at 22-25.
183. Id. at 21-33.
184. Id at 33-36.
185. Id.
186. See Kennedy, supra note 13; Kelman, supra note 13.
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articles that cite to Kehuan and Kennedy also adopt the same blunt
proposition that WTA is greater than WTP. 187
This leads to the central normative insights of the Article. If evidence
187. See Christopher H. Schroeder, In the Regulation of Manmade Carcinogens, If Feasibility
Analysis is the Answer, What is the Question?, 88 MicH. L. REv. 1483, 1502-03 (1990) (citing Kel-
man and Kennedy for the proposition that WTA exceeds WTP); John J. Donohue III, Diverting the
Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce Unemployment Spells, 99 YALE L.J. 549, 606 (1989)
(citing Kelman for the proposition that some would claim "that the power of the market is so great
and unyielding that it resembles a surging river that overruns all obstacles"); David M. Frankford,
Creating and Dividing the Fruits of Collective Economic Activity: Referrals Among Health Care Prov-
iders, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1861, 1871 (1989) (citing both Kelman and Kennedy on wealth effects);
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1699 n.196
(1988) (citing Kelman for the preposition that WTA and WTP diverge); Michael A. Fitts, The Vices
of Virtuea A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA.
L. REv. 1567, 1572 (1988) (describing, but not relying upon, Kelman and Kennedy); Joseph W.
Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611, 720 (1988) (citing both Kennedy
and Kelman for the proposition that WTA is greater than WTP); Louis Michael Seidman, Public
Principle and Private Choice The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1023 (1987) (citing Kelman for the proposition that WTA exceeds WTP);
Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 71 (1987) (citing Kel-
man as questioning the Coase Theorem); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism and Market Illusions:
The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1309, 1358 (1986) (assuming that WTA
exceeds WTP and citing Kennedy in support of that proposition); Mark Sagoff, The Principles of
Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REv. 19, 53 (1986) (citing Kelman for the proposition
that WTA exceeds WTP); Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An
Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL, L.
REv. 329, 339-40 (1986) (citing Thaler and Kelman for the proposition that WTA exceeds WTP in
the consumer, but not producer, context); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Prefer-
ences, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 1129, 1150-51 (1986) (citing Thaler, Kelman, and Kennedy for the propo-
sition that WTA is greater than WTP, and then speculating on the psychological explanations);
Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities,
34 AM. U. L. REv. 939, 963 (1985) (restating Kelman's thesis on a more general level); Saul
Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REv. 65, 77 (1985) (citing Kelman and Kennedy for the
proposition that "[e]conomic actors may be more concerned with tangible losses than with missed
opportunities of equal or greater value"); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36
STAN. L. REv. 349 (1984) (noting that the emphasis upon WTA is greater than WTP distinguishes
CLS attacks upon the efficiency norm from economists' critiques); Richard S. Markovits, supra note
172, at 1178 (claiming to find many errors in Kennedy's attack on cost/benefit analysis, but ac-
cepting that WTA is greater than WTP); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings
Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 583 (1984) (citing Kelman for the proposition that
wealth effects are changing economic allocations); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards:
Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984) (citing Kelman as a critic of law and economics);
Michael L. Zigler, Takings Law and the Contract Clause: A Takings Law Approach to Legislative
Modifications of Public Contracts, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1447, 1465 (1984) (applying WTA is greater
than WTP to covenants in land); Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of
Common-Law Thought, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 711, 750-52 (1983) (extensively discussing Kelman's
examples); Note, Subjects of Bargaining Under the NLRA and the Limits of Liberal Political Imagi-
nation, 97 HARV. L. REV. 475, 489 (1983) (citing Kelman for the proposition that a union will value
rights more if it already has the rights).
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were to show that WTA is greater than WTP under all circumstances,
then Kelman and Kennedy's critique of cost/benefit analysis, and Cohen
and Knetsch's explanation of legal doctrines, might represent appropri-
ate arguments. But evidence suggests a far more complex pattern relat-
ing WTA to WTP and leaves many of the details of this relationship
unresolved. If one applied the evidence that we reviewed in this Article
to the normative issues involving either assignments of legal rights or
determinations of damages, then one might produce different conclusions
by resolving the issues left unanswered by the experimental evidence. If
it is ultimately shown that only consumers have a WTA greater than
their WTP, then one need not worry about this source of change in valu-
ation in disputes between commercial actors."' 8 In addition, if it results
that WTA equals WTP for securities representing rights to receive cash
flows, then one need not consider this source of change in valuation in
legal disputes about financial instruments. Resolving questions such as
whether repeated participation in markets causes WTA to converge to
WTP, how long it takes for consumers to shift from WTP to WTA for
newly-acquired rights, exactly why people have a WTA greater than
their WTP, and so forth, could help to further define the circumstances
in which courts should consider using the cost/benefit definition of negli-
gence in torts. In these situations an individual's valuation of his goods
could be the measure of damages and the cost/benefit approach to the
allocation of rights might be used with some confidence.189 Similarly,
Cohen and Knetsch should use these guidelines to further develop and
enhance their explanations of legal doctrines.
Of course, none of this shows that cost/benefit analysis is the appropri-
ate mode of moral discourse for resolving any class of disputes. Critics of
the various forms of cost/benefit analysis have launched extremely pow-
erful attacks upon that norm."9 Those who have already renounced
188. In a contrary implicit assumption, Knetsch argues that subsidies and effluent charges will
be regarded differently (as gains foregone and loses avoided) by potential polluters, without address-
ing the issue that many polluters are businesses. Knetsch, supra note 175, at 234; see also COHEN &
KNETSCH, supra note 178, at 32 (applying WTA exceeds WTP to Essex Aluminum and Alcoa). In
addition, in the debate over mandatory commercial warranties, one need not be concerned about
whether WTA is greater than WTP due to wealth effects, provided that consumers are fairly homo-
geneous. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in
Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. Rav. 261 (1991).
189. This presumes that cost/benefit analysis has normative appeal when WTA is equal to WTP.
Kennedy and Kelman would certainly quarrel with that proposition.
190. See C. Edwin Baker, Starting Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HoSTRA L. REv. 939
(1980); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Fie: Can Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice? 8
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cost/benefit analysis will regard this Article's suggestion-that one
should narrow the domain of cost/benefit analysis-as irrelevant. After
all, one can hardly restrict the use of a totally unused norm. But for
those who still believe that cost/benefit analysis might have utility, the
data that we reviewed in this Article provides crucial, cautionary
guidance.
2. Governmental Shaping of Preferences
In the long run, governmental policies shape individuals' preferences.
For example, public provision of interesting, effective, challenging
schools may eventually lead to a desire for better education in the next
generation. Laws that require dog owners to clean up after their pets
may result in stronger preferences for clean streets. Laws preventing
people from selling babies or beating their spouses and children may
mold our attitudes towards the family.
Economists have usually ignored the interactions between laws and
preferences.191 In order to make analysis tractable, economic analysis
has taken individuals' preferences as a given and then inquired what laws
and social institutions would best serve those preferences. In fact,
microeconomics texts explicitly state that economics is not concerned
with good or bad preferences. Instead, economic theory accepts people's
preferences and then asks how people behave when guided by these pref-
erences.192 Economic analysis of law has been no exception to this
rule-it has treated preferences as if they were fixed by other forces.
Evidence that WTA exceeds WTP may ultimately force economists to
stop avoiding the interaction between policies and individuals' prefer-
ences. If the Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler results are correct then the
HOFSTRA L. REv. 671 (1980); Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage ofEfficency, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 641
(1980); Lewis A. Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HoFsTRA
L. REV. 591 (1980).
191. Some scholarship contends that preferences are endogenous. See T. A. Marschak, On the
Study of Taste Changing Policies, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 386 (1978); Peter J. Hammond, Changing
Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice, 43 REv. ECON. STUD. 159 (1976); Peter J. Hammond, Endog-
enous Tastes and Stable Long-Run Choice, 13 J. ECON. THEORY 329 (1976); Robert A. Pollak, Habit
Formation and Dynamic Demand Functions, 78 J. POL. ECON. 745 (1970); W. M. Gorman, Tastes,
Habits and Choices, 8 INT'L ECON. REv. 218 (1967); John C. Harsanyi, Welfare Economics of Varia-
ble Tastes, 21 REv. ECON. STUD. 204 (1954).
For a slightly different approach, see Edi Karni & David Schmeidler, Fixed Preferences and
Changing Tastes, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 262 (May 1990).
192. See, e-g., BRIAN R. BINGER & ELiZABETH HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS WITH
CALCULUS (1988); JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 9 (3d ed. 1984).
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disparity between WTA and WTP arises very quickly. This suggests that
preferences might change rather quickly as a result of policy changes.
The ratio of WTA to WTP ranges between one and a half to one (1.5:1)
and five to one (5:1), a disparity too large to ignore. For example, con-
sider the hypothetical example of a homeowner and a smelter discussed
above. If the smelter's operations degrade the environment enjoyed by
the homeowner, a court must decide (in the simplified example used in
this Article) whether or not the smelter's operations violate the home-
owner's right to a clean environment. If the homeowner has the right to
a clean environment, his WTA equals $1000, but if he has no such right,
then his WTP equals $100. Economic analysis of this law cannot avoid
the fact that choosing a legal rule simultaneously affects the home-
owner's preferences. Economic analysis will have to confront the ques-
tion whether the homeowner should value the environment highly.
Today an economist would not address such a question. Philosophers
have studied this topic, 193 and economists may soon have to become fa-
miliar with the discourse.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Experimental evidence and some theoretical analysis clearly suggest
that WTA may exceed WTP by substantial amounts. Exactly when this
will occur is not yet evident, nor are the explanations for this phenome-
non clear. In market settings, the WTA/WTP disparity tends to raise
prices and reduce the number of profitable transactions. In a two-person
bargaining setting, WTA exceeding WTP is one reason why rights may
be "sticky"-tending not to be traded once assigned. Despite the evi-
dence summarized above, however, the extent of the difference between
WTA and WTP is unknown. First, many instances exist in which con-
sumers engage in trade: buying and selling of used cars, flea markets,
and garage sales. Consumers readily trade in their old cars for new or
newer models, even when a private sale may have generated a better price
for them. Similarly, consumers sell used clothing and housewares at flea
markets and garage sales for far less then the cost of replacement. Sec-
ond, experimental evidence needs further independent replication before
it will be considered fully sound and convincing.
193. Barry Holden, Liberal Democracy and The Social Determination of Ideas, 25 NOMOs: LIB-
ERAL DEMOCRACY 289 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983); Aaron Wildavsky,
Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation, 81
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 3 (1987).
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If one concludes that WTA is greater than WTP in specific circum-
stances, then the basic normative implications are reasonably clear:
courts cannot always legitimately use the cost/benefit definition of negli-
gence, nor always rely upon individuals' values as unproblematic meas-
ures of damages, nor always use cost/benefit analysis to assign rights.
The Kelman and Kennedy critiques anticipated these implications. But
in some circumstances, WTA might equal WTP, and under those cir-
cumstances courts might be able to utilize individual values and the vari-
ous forms of cost/benefit analysis based upon those values. Further
research should help trace the boundaries of these circumstances.
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